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COST V. QUALITY IN THE REGULATION
OF PREFERRED PROVIDER
ARRANGEMENTS: A "GREEN
LIGHT TO THE GOLD RUSH"?
by Lori A. Tobias
HE Texas State Board of Insurance recently adopted rules that per-
mit commercial insurance companies to market preferred provider
health insurance plans.' The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules
authorize commercial insurers to develop preferred provider arrangements
and to offer a different level of coverage to insureds who obtain health care
services from preferred providers.2 Drafted to address the conflicting public
policy objectives of cost containment and quality assurance in health care
delivery, the rules set forth minimum standards derived from the Texas In-
surance Code for establishing preferred provider arrangements 3 and pre-
ferred provider health insurance plans.4 Principal actors in the Texas
Preferred Provider Plan rulemaking process included commercial insurers,
insurance regulators, and representatives of the provider community. The
final version of the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules represents the prod-
uct of a two-year process marked by legislative, administrative, and judicial
action. 5
1. State Bd. Ins., 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705 (Nov. 1, 1986) (Preferred Pro-
vider Plan Rules).
2. Id. § 3.3701.
3. Hereinafter referred to in the text and notes alternatively as preferred provider ar-
rangements or PPAs.
4. For a summary of the specific Texas Insurance Code provisions impacting the issu-
ance of preferred provider health insurance plans, see State Bd. Ins., 11 Tex. Reg. 2810, 2811-
12 (June 17, 1986).
5. For a comprehensive chronology of the proceedings attendant to the Texas Preferred
Provider Plan rulemaking process, see TEXAS MED. ASS'N, PPO POLICY DEVELOPMENT FOR
TMA AND THE STATE OF TEXAS (June 17, 1986) [hereinafter TMA CHRONOLOGY]; see also
Wilcox, Preferred Provider Plans and Contracts with Physicians, TEX. MED., Sept. 1986, at 65,
65-67. In 1984 Commercial State Life Insurance Company (Commercial Life), an affiliate of
Humana Insurance Co., Inc., submitted a health insurance policy form to the State Board of
Insurance (the Board) for approval pursuant to article 3.42 of the Texas Insurance Code.
TMA CHRONOLOGY, supra, at 1; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.42(c) (Vernon 1981 & Supp.
1988) (insurers required to file policy forms with Board sixty days prior to issuance); id. art.
3.42(a) (issuance, delivery, and use of group accident or health insurance policy prohibited
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This Comment analyzes the regulatory framework that impacts the for-
prior to Board approval). The proposed policy provided for an alternate level of benefits for
insureds who elected to obtain treatment from a physician at a participating hospital. See
Supplemental Amicus Brief in Opposition to Commercial State Life Insurance Company's Ap-
plication for Review of Commission's Order No. 85-0677 at 4, In re Appeal of Commercial
State Life Insurance Company, No. 1456 State Board of Insurance (Apr. 15, 1985) [hereinafter
TMA Supplemental Amicus Brief]. On April 15, 1985, the Commissioner disapproved the
policy. Order No. 85-0677, Disapproving Commercial State Life Insurance Company Pro-
posed Policy Forms (Apr. 15, 1985). Commercial Life appealed the Commissioner's disap-
proval of its policy form to the full Board. TMA CHRONOLOGY, supra, at 1. The Board
reversed the Commissioner's decision and approved the proposed Commercial Life policy
form. Id. at 1.
During the course of these administrative proceedings, representatives from the insurance
industry lobbied for the enactment of legislation that would amend the Insurance Code to
eliminate statutory barriers to the issuance of preferred provider health insurance plans. See
Tex. S.B. 413, 69th Leg. (1985); Tex. H.B. 1129, 69th Leg. (1985). On April 8, 1985, the
Texas Medical Association (TMA) Emergency Policy Board voted to defeat insurance indus-
try legislation and seek an interim legislative study addressing preferred provider health insur-
ance policies. TMA CHRONOLOGY, supra, at 1. Due to strong TMA opposition, legislative
initiatives were defeated in both houses of the Texas Legislature. Id.; see Memorandum from
A. Gilchrist to TMA Task Force on Contract Provider Organizations (CPOs) (Sept. 30, 1985)
[hereinafter TMA Task Force Memo] (outlines formulation of TMA position on CPOs and
TMA lobbying efforts to defeat insurance industry-sponsored preferred provider legislation
prior to and during 1985 Regular Session of Texas Legislature); Memorandum from D. Wilcox
to TMA Task Force on CPOs (Jan. 3, 1986) [hereinafter TMA Safeguard Memo] (outlines
TMA legislative counterproposals relating to freedom of physician choice, access to medical
care, quality of care, and other provisions designed to guarantee appropriate decision-making
and prevent unfair terms); see also Tex. S.B. 1206, 68th Leg. (1983) (defeated) (providing for
removal of statutory restrictions on insurers' ability to contract with selected physicians to
provide medical services). For a discussion of the statutory barriers to the issuance of pre-
ferred provider plans, see supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
On October 23, 1985, TMA requested that the Board reconsider its approval of the Com-
mercial Life policy. TMA CHRONOLOGY, supra, at 2. Two days later, TMA filed suit in the
District Court of Travis County seeking a declaratory judgment that approval of the Commer-
cial Life policy was outside the scope of the Board's, statutory authority. Id.; see TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. art. 3.42(i) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988) (parties may file appeals from any order
of the Board issued pursuant to its policy approval process pursuant to art. 21.80 of the Insur-
ance Code); id. art. 21.80 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988) (insurance company or any other party
in interest dissatisfied with any decision, regulation, order, or ruling adopted by Board may file
petition in District Court of Travis County, Texas, against Board as defendant). On Novem-
ber 7, 1985, Commercial Life requested that the Board rule on TMA's standing to challenge
the action taken by the Board. TMA CHRONOLOGY, supra, at 2. On December 19, 1985, the
Board acknowledged TMA's standing to challenge approval of the Commercial Life policy,
granted TMA's motion to reconsider approval of the policy form, and remanded the Commer-
cial Life application to the Commissioner with instructions that he delay findings until the
Board adopted final rules regarding preferred provider health insurance policies. Id. At the
same time, the Board issued proposed rules governing preferred provider plans and solicited
public comment. State Bd. Ins., 10 Tex. Reg. 4729 (Dec. 10, 1985) (proposed to be codified at
28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705). In comments submitted to the Board, Donald P.
Wilcox, TMA General Counsel, urged the Board to consider the impact that the proposed
rules would have on public policy issues. Mr. Wilcox commented, "Surely the Board does not
wish to irresponsibly give the green light to the gold rush which will follow just to see what
will happen with respect to insurance and health care under this drastic new scheme." D.
Wilcox, Comments of Texas Medical Association on Texas Proposed Preferred Provider Plan
Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705 (1986) (Jan. 15, 1985) [hereinafter TMA Com-
ments].
On January 17, 1986, the Board conducted a hearing at which it received testimony on the
proposed preferred provider plan rules and appointed an advisory committee to recommend
changes to the rules. TMA CHRONOLOGY, supra, at 3. The advisory committee included five
representatives nominated by TMA, three representatives of the insurance industry, a proprie-
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mation and operation of insurer-sponsored preferred provider arrangements.
Section one charts the trend toward competitive solutions to rising health
care costs and identifies the factors that have prompted the development of
preferred provider arrangements as an alternative health care finance and
delivery system. By analyzing the six principal components of the preferred
provider health care finance and delivery system, section two provides an
outline of the structure and operation of preferred provider arrangements.
Section three describes four distinct applications of the basic PPA model.
To facilitate an evaluation of the regulatory scheme adopted by the Texas
State Board of Insurance, section four identifies the scope and outlines spe-
cific provisions of the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules, model preferred
provider plan legislation, and the statutes and regulations enacted in other
states that govern preferred provider health benefit plans. The discussion
focuses on the provisions relating to provider contracting, preferred provider
health care benefits, provider referral, utilization and quality management
procedures, and consumer protection. Finally, section five critically ana-
lyzes specific provisions of the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules.
I. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT
The Texas State Health Care Plan 6 identifies health care service reim-
bursement as the primary contributing factor to health care cost escalation. 7
According to the report, approximately seventy percent of all health care
tary hospital spokesperson, a third party administrator, and a former Board chairman. Id. On
March 18, 1986, the advisory committee submitted amended proposed rules to the Board for
approval. Id. A majority and minority report accompanied the advisory committee's propos-
als. See STATE BD. INS. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES ON PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGS.,
MAJORITY REPORT (Mar. 14, 1986); STATE BD. INS. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES ON PRE-
FERRED PROVIDER ORGS., MINORITY REPORT (Mar. 14, 1986) [hereinafter MINORITY RE-
PORT]. Reflecting TMA's determination to safeguard physician and patient interests, the
minority report called for physician control of provider selection, utilization review, and qual-
ity assurance. Id. at 2, 6 & attachment 3; see also TMA TASK FORCE ON CPOs, REPORT OF
TMA TASK FORCE ON CONTRACT PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS TO THE [TMA] EXECUTIVE
BOARD (Mar. 23, 1986) [hereinafter TMA TASK FORCE REPORT]. After continued negotia-
tions, the Board further revised the amended proposed rules to incorporate certain safeguards
recommended by TMA. See TMA Safeguard Memo, supra, at 1-5. The Board approved the
revised rules, which became effective on July 1, 1986. State Bd. Ins., 11 Tex. Reg. 2810 (June
17, 1986) (codified at 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705).
6. TEXAS DEP'T OF HEALTH, TEXAS STATE HEALTH CARE PLAN FOR 1987-88 (1986)
[hereinafter TDH HEALTH CARE PLAN].
7. Id. § XVII. For analyses of health care expenditures on the national and state level,
see Arnett, McKusick, Sonnefeld & Cowell, Projections of Health Care Spending to 1990,
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring, 1986, at 1 [hereinafter Arnett & McKusick]; Begley &
Mains, Health Care Spending in Texas, 1975-1984, TEX. MED., Sept. 1987, at 30. A recent
national study predicted that: (1) national health expenditures from 1984 to 1990 would in-
crease at an 8.7% average annual rate, two-thirds of the 12.6% rate measured over the previ-
ous eight-year period; (2) health care sector's share of GNP will gradually increase from
10.6% in 1984 to 11.3% in 1990; and (3) government financing and private sector cost con-
tainment mechanisms will constitute a source of downward pressure on health care spending.
Arnett & McKusick, supra, at 5-9. According to an analysis of Texas health care expendi-
tures: (1) the annual growth rate of health care expenditures is higher in Texas than the na-
tional average; (2) the most rapidly growing item of expenditure is prepayment and
administration for the operation of private third-party insurance programs, Medicaid, and the
state portion of Medicare; and (3) 78% of prepayment and administrative expenditures go to
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purchases are financed via third-party payors, typically on the basis of cost
reimbursement.8 Cost-based reimbursement mechanisms promote the phe-
nomenon of "moral hazard," wherein insurance itself fuels increases in the
cost of health care. 9 In response to rising health care costs, purchasers and
providers have attempted to promote a more direct interest in cost contain-
ment on the part of participants in the health care marketplace.I° Alterna-
tive health care finance and delivery systems' seek to reduce aggregate
health care costs while maintaining access to quality health care by restruc-
turing health care reimbursement to provide incentives for cost-effective ser-
vice delivery.' 2
II. STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF PREFERRED PROVIDER
ARRANGEMENTS
Preferred provider arrangements 13 represent an emerging form of alterna-
tive health care finance and delivery system.14 Based on a series of contracts
private health insurance companies, representing the difference between premiums received
and claims incurred. Begley & Mains, supra, at 33.
8. TDH HEALTH CARE PLAN, supra note 6, § XVII.
9. See Thurow, Medicine v. Economics, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 611, 612 (1985).
10. See B.N.A., HEALTH CARE COSTS: WHERE'S THE BOTTOM LINE? 1 (1986) [herein-
after B.N.A., BOTTOM LINE?] (outlines series of initiatives undertaken by purchasers and
providers of health care services to contain costs); Levey & Hesse, Bottom-Line Health Care?
312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 644 (1985) (analyzes trend towards business-like health care manage-
ment style); Thurow, supra note 9, at 612 (advocates prospective reimbursement system to
promote payor and provider interest in cost containment).
11. See V. FUCHS, THE HEALTH ECONOMY 340-41 (1986). Fuchs observes that new re-
imbursement methods tend to lower costs for specific payors, replace payments for individual
units of service with a single global payment, set reimbursement rates on a prospective basis,
and require consumers to make more choices and accept increased financial responsibility. Id.
For an analysis of selected alternative health care finance and delivery systems, see AMERICAN
MED. ASS'N, AN INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
(1983); MACDONALD, MEYER & ESSIG, HEALTH CARE LAW: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
§ 7.03[5] (1987) [hereinafter MACDONALD & MEYER]; Lemkin, Alternative Delivery Systems:
HMOs, PPOs, and CMPs, 371 PRACT. L. INST. 231, 231-91 (1985).
12. For a definition of cost-effective health care service delivery, see Doubilet, Weinstein
& McNeil, Use and Misuse of the Term Cost-Effective in Medicine, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED.
253, 253-56 (cost-effective means producing additional benefit worth additional cost).
13. Preferred provider arrangements are commonly referred to as preferred provider orga-
nizations (PPOs). The reference to an organization may constitute a misnomer. Commenta-
tors have proposed a variety of PPO definitions. "The PPO is not so much an organization as
a technique for packaging or integrating health care services to be sold to bulk purchasers."
Holmquest & James, Preferred Provider Organizations-An Emerging Health Care Delivery
System, TEX. MED., Apr. 1985, at 57, 57.
In point of fact, most Preferred Provider Organizations are not organizations at
all, from the physician's perspective. They are, instead, a contractual arrange-
ment between health care providers (professional and/or institutional) and em-
ployers, insurance carriers or third-party administrators, to provide health care
services to a defined population at established fees which may or may not be a
discount from usual and customary or reasonable charges ....
AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, A PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE TO PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
3 (1983) [hereinafter AMA PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE].
14. The American Association of Preferred Provider Organizations (AAPPO) directory
lists 674 operational preferred provider arrangements. American Ass'n of Preferred Provider
Orgs., Directory of Operational PPOs (1987). Current statistics represent the consistent in-
crease in PPA activity in recent years. The AAPPO directory reported 143 operational PPAs
COMMENTS
between group purchasers of health care, health care providers, and under-
writers of health care benefits,15 preferred provider arrangements are
designed to contain costs by promoting competition in the health care mar-
ketplace.1 6 Six principal components comprise the preferred provider health
care finance and delivery system: (1) a select panel of providers; (2) a negoti-
ated fee-for-services reimbursement schedule; (3) an open panel service de-
livery system; (4) an incentive driven benefits package; (5) an aggressive
program of utilization management; and (6) a quality assurance scheme.1 7
By monitoring the price and effectiveness of services delivered, the compo-
nents of the preferred provider health care finance and delivery system func-
tion to reduce the group purchaser's health care costs while maintaining
quality health care service delivery.18
A. Component One: Select Provider Panel
The dynamics of the preferred provider contracting process enable pur-
chasers to actively select efficient providers for participation in the system. 19
Selection criteria for professional providers may include price, effective prac-
tice management, proficient diagnosis and treatment skills, and a conserva-
in December, 1984, 325 PPAs in October, 1985, and 369 PPAs in October, 1986. See DiBlase,
Preferred Provider Organizations Evolve as Market Impact Expands, Bus. INS., Feb. 16, 1987,
at 3, 4.
15. Commentators regard the use of direct contracting for health care services as repre-
sentative of a fundamental change in the way health care services are bought and sold. Bo-
land, The Role of Preferred Provider Contracting in the Healthcare Market, in THE NEW
HEALTHCARE MARKET: A GUIDE TO PPOS FOR PURCHASERS, PAYORS AND PROVIDERS 3
(P. Boland ed. 1985). [hereinafter NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET]. The prediction is that the
contracting process will impact the way purchasers regard health care and the way providers
regard business. Id. Specifically, the preferred provider contracting process will educate pur-
chasers to the economics of health care delivery, enabling them to buy health care services
with the same appreciation for efficiency and quality that they apply to the purchase of other
goods and services. Id. The contracting process will produce a corresponding effect on health
care providers by conditioning them to apply commercial priorities such as cost control and
performance to the delivery of health care services. Id. at 4.
16. See infra note 18.
17. Analysts from the health care research firm InterStudy first outlined the defining
characteristics of a preferred provider arrangement. See L. ELLWEIN & D. GREGG, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (1982).
18. For empirical analyses of the operation and cost-effectiveness of PPA health care fi-
nance and delivery systems, see Billet & Cantor, Employer's Experience With Preferred Pro-
vider Organizations, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS MGMT., Autumn, 1985, at 21, 21-26 (survey
of 140 employees' experiences with PPOs); Gabel, Ermann, Rice & de Lissovoy, The Emer-
gence and Future of PPOs, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 305 (1986) [hereinafter Gabel &
Ermann] (national telephone survey of 140 PPOs examines PPO activity in selected market
segments as indicators of future trends in PPO organization and operation including cost con-
tainment devices); Hosek & Marquis, Preferred Provider Organization Project (study in pro-
gress 1984-1988 by Rand Corporation for Department of Health and Human Services)
(documenting employer health care cost containment experience under preferred provider ar-
rangements); Hester, Wouters & Wright, Evaluation of a Preferred Provider Organization, 65
MILBANK Q. 575-613 (1987) [hereinafter Hester & Wouters] (prepared for Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation, Program for Research and Development on Health Costs) (case study
evaluation of employer-sponsored PPA cost-effectiveness).
19. See AMA PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE, supra note 13, at 14-15; Enthoven, An Economic
Analysis of the "Preferred Provider Organization" Concept, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET,
supra note 15, at 94, 100-103.
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tive pattern of resource utilization and referral. 20 Institutional provider
selection factors may include price, optimum average lengths of stay, con-
servative medical staff utilization and referral patterns, and efficient adminis-
tration. 21 As a fundamental element of the preferred provider health care
system, the formation of an economical provider panel allows providers to
promote health care cost containment prior to service delivery.
B. Component Two: Negotiated Reimbursement
Comprising the second component of the preferred provider health care
finance system, discounted provider reimbursement schedules complement
panel composition as a mechanism for cost containment. 22 Negotiated pro-
vider price reductions constitute consideration for the potential increase in
patient volume that accompanies PPA participation. 23 Moreover, provider
discounts create the potential for purchaser cost savings by reducing the per-
unit price of health care services delivered pursuant to preferred provider
arrangements. 24
C. Component Three: Preferred Provider Benefits
The aggregate level of cost savings under a preferred provider arrange-
ment depends on enrollee participation. 25 Accordingly, this component of
the preferred provider health care finance system supplies enrollees with a
financial incentive to obtain services from preferred providers. Financial in-
centives may include levels of coverage, 26 decreased cost sharing, 27 or guar-
20. See Enthoven, supra note 19, at 102-03.
21. See id. at 101-02.
22. See AMA PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE, supra note 13, at 16; Arnett & McKusick, supra note
7, at 7, 10.
23. PPA sponsors may set per-unit prices for physician services on the basis of usual,
customary, and reasonable (UCR) charges or a relative value system. Rothenberg, Healthcare
Buyers' Approach to Selective Contracting, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at
390, 399-400. UCR charges are literally the fee that an individual provider customarily
charges for a particular service. Id. at 398. PPA organizers may negotiate for a straightfor-
ward discount from each UCR charge. Id. Alternatively, PPAs may set a single conversion
factor that, when multiplied by a standard relative value unit assigned to each physician ser-
vice, establishes the fee for each procedure. Id. at 399-400. Capitation constitutes a third
option for physician service pricing. Boland, Evaluation Criteria for Assessing Negotiated Pro-
vider Agreements: A Guide for Healthcare Purchasers, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra
note 15, at 250, 268. PPA sponsors may set prices for hospital services on the basis of: (1) per
patient day or per diem rates; (2) across the board or service-specific negotiated discounts from
established hospital charges; (3) per case prices based on a prospectively determined rate; or
(4) per capitation based on a predetermined rate for each covered beneficiary. Id. at 265-66;
see also Leal, Payor's Perspective on Reimbursement Methods Under a Preferred Provider Ar-
rangement, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 459,461-65. For an analysis of
alternative methods of health care reimbursement, see MACDONALD & MEYER, supra note 11,
§ 7.02[2].
24. See supra note 23.
25. Hester & Wouters, supra note 18 (if PPA costs are 30% lower than costs of competi-
tor plan, but PPA directs only 10% of total health care expenditures to its provider panel, then
it will only reduce overall expenses by 3%).
26. See C. VADAKIN & Z. LIPTON, THE HEALTH INSURANCE ANSWER BOOK 119 (1986)
(discussing alternate coverage levels as one form of incentive to utilize preferred providers).
27. Preferred provider health benefit plans typically pay a larger amount of the insured's
1160 [Vol. 41
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antees against balanced billing. 28 By promoting the use of cost-efficient
preferred providers, incentive driven benefits packages potentially multiply
purchaser cost savings.29
D. Component Four: Open Panel Service Delivery
In contrast to the closed system, health care delivery, and referral adopted
by health maintenance organizations, 30 the open panel preferred provider
health care delivery system permits insureds to obtain covered services from
either panel or nonpanel providers. 31 Because insureds receive a basic level
of coverage irrespective of the panel membership of the health care service
provider, the preferred provider health care delivery system promotes flexi-
bility in provider selection and referral. 32 Characterized as a "soft lock in"
system,33 the PPA open panel delivery system permits insureds to exercise a
consumer's prerogative in purchasing health care services3 4 and providers to
exercise professional judgment in delivery health care services.3 5
E. Component Five: Utilization Management
Preferred provider contracts generally reimburse providers at set fees for
individual units of service. 36 Under a conventional, fee-for-service reim-
bursement calculus, the quantity of services rendered remains a function of
provider discretion.3 7 As a result, in an open panel PPA, provider discounts
represent only a partial solution for reducing health care costs. To reinforce
cost containment, the utilization management component of the preferred
provider health care delivery system monitors the quantities of health care
resources expended by panel providers.38
expenses when the insured obtains services from a preferred provider. Id. Preferred provider
plans decrease an insured's expenses by varying deductible and coinsurance amounts. Id.
Under an incentive plan, the third-party payor retains the standard deductible and coinsurance
level for nonpreferred provider reimbursement, but decreases the level for preferred provider
reimbursement. Id. Under a punitive plan, the third-party payor retains the deductible and
coinsurance level for preferred provider reimbursement, but increases the level for nonpre-
ferred provider reimbursement. Id.
28. See Maturi & Raichel, Preferred Provider Arrangements: Market and Delivery System
Perspectives, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 19, 25 (preferred providers
may agree to accept per unit benefit program payment levels as payment in full for services
delivered to enrollees).
29. Gabel & Ermann, supra note 18, at 307.
30. Hereinafter referred to in the text and notes alternatively as health maintenance orga-
nizations or HMOs. For discussion of the HMO health care service delivery system, see MAC-
DONALD & MEYER, supra note 11, § 7.03[5]; Lemkin, supra note 11, at 1-27.
31. Enthoven, supra note 19, at 95-96.
32. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
33. Enthoven, supra note 19, at 96.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 23.
37. Fee-for-service medicine is regarded as a hallmark of professional autonomy. See P.
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 25 (1982).
38. Recent PPA studies indicate that utilization review constitutes the primary mecha-
nism for cost control under preferred provider arrangements. See HEALTH RESEARCH INST.,
1985 HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SURVEY 2 (1986); Gabel & Ermann, supra note 18,
at 312; see also DiBlase, Utilization Review Programs Paying Off, Bus. INS., Feb. 16, 1987, at
1988] 1161
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PPA utilization management programs may be administered on a dele-
gated basis by the sponsoring entity,39 or participating provider,4° on a
nondelegated basis by a peer review organization 4' or private review corpo-
ration.4 2 In order to eliminate the incentive for maximizing reimbursement
through over-utilization,43 utilization review personnel screen treatment de-
cisions during the course of service delivery to determine whether the treat-
ment is medically necessary and, if so, whether the treatment is being
properly administered. 44 Conducted at each stage in the delivery process,
utilization review is designed to ensure that care is being delivered at an
appropriate facility, by an appropriate health care professional, using appro-
priate resources, over an appropriate period of time.4 5 A comprehensive
utilization management program for an inpatient hospital stay, therefore,
may include preadmission certification, 46 admission review, 47 concurrent
treatment review,48 continued stay review,49 and discharge planning.5 0
32, 32-34 (prevalence and effectiveness of utilization review mechanisms as component of
traditional and alternative health care delivery systems). Utilization review mechanisms may
be prospective, concurrent, or retrospective. For empirical analyses of the effectiveness of vari-
ous methods of utilization review, see Cleary & Jette, The Validity of Self-Reported Physician
Utilization Measures, 22 MED. CARE 796 (1984); Eisenberg, Physician Utilization-The State
of Research About Physician's Practice Patterns, 23 MED. CARE 461 (1985); Garg, Kleinberg,
Schmitt & Baransky, A New Methodology for Ancillary Services Review, 23 MED. CARE 809
(1985); Jackson & Blank, Utilization Reporting System Facilitates Physician Practice Analysis,
J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., Feb. 1986, at 16, 23-29; Mushlin, Cost Containment Opportu-
nities in Medicine, 4 QUALITY REV. BULL. 378 (1985). For a further discussion of utilization
review methods, see infra notes 39-50.
39. See Anthony, PPOs. Will They Compromise Quality of Care?, PHYSICIAN'S MGMT.,
Dec. 1985, at 76, 90; see also AMA PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE, supra note 13, at 19.
40. See Anthony, supra note 39, at 90; see also AMA PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE, supra note 13,
at 19.
41. See Dans, Weiner & Otter, Peer Review Organizations: Promises and Potential Pitfalls,
313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1131 (1985); cf Finding the Insurers: What's TMF AllAbout? TEX.
MED., Feb. 1986, at 66, 66-69 (interview with chief executive officer of Texas Medical Founda-
tion, designated state peer review organization).
42. See Anthony, supra note 39, at 87; see also AMA PHYSICIAN'S GUIDE, supra note 13,
at 19.
43. See Oehm, Utilization Review Methods and Incentives, in NEW HEALTHCARE MAR-
KET, supra note 15, at 298, 309 (exhibit presents provider incentives for overutilization as
function of identified market characteristics).
44. See id. at 300.
45. See id. at 301-11.
46. To reduce unnecessary hospitalization, providers and patients subject to preadmission
certification must submit diagnostic information or planned procedures to a review organiza-
tion before entering the hospital or receiving any treatment. Id. at 301.
47. After the patient is admitted to the hospital under an arrangement requiring admis-
sion review, a representative conducts a patient record review to determine whether the admis-
sion is medically necessary and appropriate. Id. at 302.
48. Concurrent treatment review monitors the utilization of health care services during
the course of treatment. Id. at 302-03; Masciantonio, Business Requirements for Implementing
PPOs, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 756, 761. Persons conducting con-
current treatment review may recommend an accelerated discharge schedule or transfer to an
intermediate care facility. Id. at 761.
49. Designed to minimize the length of hospital stay, continued stay review assesses the
patient's continued hospitalization for medical necessity and appropriateness. Oehm, supra
note 43, at 302-03.
50. To facilitate timely discharge, allied health personnel may coordinate transfer to an
intermediate care facility or the delivery of home health care services. Id. at 303.
1162 [Vol. 41
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F Component Six." Quality Assurance
Preferred provider arrangements purport to facilitate the cost-effective de-
livery of high quality health care services. 51 To delivery quality guarantees,
the quality assurance component of the preferred provider health care deliv-
ery system is designed to ensure that health care services rendered by partici-
pating providers meet acceptable professional standards.5 2 PPAs may
perform quality assurance activities on a delegated or nondelegated basis.
PPAs employing delegated quality assurance mechanisms use participating
providers to assess the quality of health care services. 53 PPAs utilizing
nondelegated quality assurance mechanisms conduct quality assurance activ-
ities through an independent peer review organization. 54
III. MODELS OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ARRANGEMENTS
Preferred provider contract negotiations provide participants with an op-
portunity to bargain for payment and delivery terms in advance of treat-
ment. Because each participant brings a unique set of concerns to the health
care bargaining table, 55 the resulting finance and delivery agreements take a
variety of forms. Variations in the financing and delivery of health care serv-
ices under certain preferred provider arrangements permit the articulation of
four distinct PPA models. 56 Factors that contribute to the categorization of
PPAs include: (1) the identity of the entity that initiates provider con-
tracting; and (2) the extent to which that entity underwrites the financial risk
of providing health care benefits. 57 Based on these factors, PPAs may be
broadly classified as either preferred provider networks, entrepreneur-based
51. Larson, The Jury Is Still Out: Do PPOs Practice Quality Medicine?, PHYSICIAN'S
MGMT., Feb. 1985, at 298, 308 (PPA movement is built on provision of quality health care
services).
52. For an analysis of alternative methods for measuring quality of care, see Brook &
Lohr, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Variations, and Quality, 23 MED. CARE 710 (1985);
Donabedian, The Definition of Quality and Approaches to its Assessment, in 1 EXPLORATIONS
IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING (1980); Johnston, Measuring the Quality of
Care, TEX. MED., Jan. 1988, at 38; Merry, What Is Quality Care? A Model for Measuring
Health Care Excellence, 6 QUALITY REV. BULL. 298, 298-301 (1987); Reinhardt, Quality of
Care in Competitive Markets, Bus. & HEALTH, July-Aug. 1986, at 7, 7-9.
53. Larson, supra note 51, at 308 (PPA evaluates physician performance on basis of
American Medical Association (AMA) standards).
54. See supra note 41.
55. Purchaser incentives to participate in PPAs include (1) the potential for cost savings
and (2) the ability to offer enhanced benefits to insureds such as lower out-of-pocket expenses,
increased coverage, and access to high quality providers. Flachbart, Organizing and Develop-
ing a PPO, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 529, 531. Provider incentives to
participate in PPAs include: (1) maintenance or increase in market share; (2) retention of fee-
for-service reimbursement structure; (3) efficient claims payment; and (4) development of a
mechanism to foster other cooperative ventures among providers. Id. at 531.
56. To facilitate an evaluation of the laws and regulations governing one type of preferred
provider arrangement, this Comment defines PPA models using both a functional and a struc-
tural approach. Accordingly, this Comment's definitional framework incorporates certain as-
pects of a functionally oriented PPA classification system designed by Peter N. Grant and a
structurally oriented system designed by Peter Boland. See Boland, supra note 23, at 262-64;
Grant, Redefining Preferred Provider Contracting Models, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET,
supra note 15, at 38, 39-43.
57. Grant, supra note 56, at 38-43.
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preferred provider arrangements, purchaser-based preferred provider ar-
rangements, or preferred provider health benefit plans.
A. Preferred Provider Networks
A preferred provider network consists of a group of professional and insti-
tutional health care providers that coordinate services to offer a system of
care to group purchasers.58 Members of a preferred provider network may
incorporate to form an integrated service corporation59 that offers a product
that includes discounted health care services, comprehensive utilization and
quality controls, and administrative and marketing services.6° The service
corporation may contract with an entrepreneur, a self-insured employer, or
an insurance carrier to serve as the provider component of an entrepreneur
or purchaser-based PPA or a preferred provider health benefit plan.61
1. Physician-Sponsored Preferred Provider Networks
Physician-sponsored preferred provider networks purport to assemble
health care professionals committed to the delivery of cost effective high
quality medical care. 62 Network coordinators emphasize provider selec-
tion63 and stringent utilization review"' as mechanisms for cost control.
Physician networks generally focus on the provision of ambulatory care
services. 65 As a result, they often elect to use an intermediary to establish
necessary hospital arrangements. 66 Physician networks traditionally finance
service delivery by entering into contracts with self-insured employers or in-
58. Id. at 42.
59. Brook & Anthony, Provider Inducement in Selective Contracting, in NEW HEALTH-
CARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 543, 554.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 551; Adams-Ryan, Peddecord & Root, Operational and Legal Implications of
Preferred Provider Organizations, Hosp. & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., May-June, 1985, at 44,
47 [hereinafter Adams-Ryan & Peddecord]. Preferred provider network formation produces a
cooperative business venture among potential competitors that raises substantive antitrust is-
sues. For an analysis of the antitrust implications of preferred provider networking, see Clas-
sen, Provider-Based Preferred Provider Organizations: A Viable Alternative Under Present
Federal Antitrust Policies? 66 N.C.L. REV. 253, 254-81 (1988); Elden & Hinden, Legal Issues
in Creating PPOs, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 2-22 (1987); Finke & Gary, Physicians and PPOs.
Antitrust Lessons From Maricopa, Hosp. MED. STAFF, July, 1983, at 10, 10-15; Perkins, Mer-
cer & McClary, Monopolies, Maricopa, and Marketing: A Case Study, Hosp. & HEALTH
SERvs. ADMIN., July-Aug. 1986, at 34, 34-44; J. McGrath, Remarks at the American Bar
Association Antitrust Spring Meeting Concerning Preferred Provider Organizations and the
Antitrust.Laws (Mar. 22, 1985).
62. For a case study of the leading physician sponsored preferred provider network, see
Zalta, Case Study: CaPP CARE Fountain Valley, California, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET,
supra note 15, at 966, 966-74; see also Physician Cost Cuts Spur PPO Success, Hosp., Mar. 16,
1985 at 65, 65 [hereinafter PPO Success].
63. See Anthony, supra note 39, at 83; Zalta, supra note 62, at 969.
64. See Zalta, supra note 62, at 969 (program of cost containment under which 1,300
surgical procedures must be performed on outpatient basis and 1,700 elective surgical proce-
dures require pretreatment authorization); see also Frederick, The Buck Stops With These Doc-
tors-And They Like It, MED. ECON., Aug. 19, 1985, at 73, 74-82.




surance carriers. 67 The insurance carrier usually generates the appropriate
reimbursement schedule and offers it to network physicians on an individual
or network basis.68
2. Hospital-Sponsored Preferred Provider Networks
An individual hospital, 69 groups of hospitals within a particular market, 70
or constituents of multi-hospital chains7' may organize preferred provider
networks. Hospitals generally establish the networking body as a separate
corporation. 72 The corporation first enters into contracts with the hospital
and its medical staff to secure administrative and clinical services. 73 Based
on these contracts, the corporation then negotiates with group purchasers to
provide hospital and medical services to their enrollees. 74
B. Entrepreneur-Based Preferred Provider Arrangements
A third-party administrator 75 or an independent investor 76 may coordi-
nate the formation and operation of an entrepreneur-based preferred pro-
vider arrangements. Entrepreneurs form PPAs by matching providers that
agree to a reduced reimbursement schedule and utilization review with
group purchasers that assume the financial risk of underwriting health care
benefits and supply enrollees. 77 Under the direction of a PPA administrator,
an entrepreneur-based PPA operates to offer providers and enrollees group-
67. See infra notes 74, 79.
68. Id.; see also Zalta, supra note 62, at 971 (chart delineates contractual relationships in
physician-sponsored preferred provider arrangements).
69. See Travella, Hospitals Turn to PPOs to Bolster Business, Bus. INS., July 22, 1985, at
31, 31; Trauner & Hunt, Hospitals That Contract With PPOs: Who Are They?, Bus. &
HEALTH, Mar. 1986, at 30, 30-33.
70. See Hospital's Rising Admissions Linked to PPA Contracting, Hoses. June 1, 1985, at
45, 45 (discussing Long Beach, California based Memorial Health Services); Travella, supra
note 69, at 31.
71. See Barkholz, Investors-Owned Chains in Race to Introduce Insurance Products, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 31, 1986, at 50, 50; Gabel & Ermann, supra note 18, at 316-18; Plant,
Risky Business: PPOs Present Greater Financial, Actuarial Risk for Sponsoring Multis, MUL-
TIS, Mar. 1, 1984, at 44, 44-50. But see DiBlase, Competition Forces AMI to Shutter Fledging
PPO, Bus. INS., Sept. 1, 1986, at 2, 2 (multi discontinues preferred provider group health
product).
72. See Roebel, Knowlton & Rosenberg, Hospital Sponsored Preferred Provider Organiza-
tions, 12 L. MED. & HEALTHCARE 204, 205 (1984) (outlines business and legal issues relating
to formation of hospital-sponsored PPAs).
73. Id. See generally, AMERICAN HosP. ASS'N, HMO/PPO SELECTIVE CONTRACTING:
ISSUES FOR HOSPITALS (1985) (outlines hospital strategy for participation in PPOs, methods
for evaluating PPO contract provisions); Blacker & Mickelson, Negotiating Contracts with
PPOs, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Sept. 1983, at 48, 48-50 (outlines potential contract issues
including rate arrangements, utilization review procedures, closed staff PPAs); Feller, Con-
tracting Guidelines for Hospitals, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Feb. 1985, at 79, 79-80 (lists
thirty suggested questions relating to negotiation of preferred provider contracts).
74. Richman, Hospitals Should Mull Implications of HMO, PPO Contracts-Experts,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 5, 1985, at 38, 40.
75. DiBlase, supra note 14, at 6 (discusses PPA contracting activities of third-party ad-
ministrator, Admar Corp.).
76. See Jasper, Case Study: Benefit Panel Services, Los Angeles, CA, in NEW HEALTH-
CARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 1035, 1035-43.
77. Boland, supra note 23, at 264.
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specific utilization review, claims processing, actuarial reporting systems, fi-
nancial and accounting services, and planning mechanisms. 78
C. Purchaser-Based Preferred Provider Arrangements
Large employers and labor organizations increasingly opt to insure em-
ployee health care expenditures from corporate earnings or trust fund contri-
butions.79 As group purchasers of health care that have elected to assume
the financial risk of underwriting health care benefits, self-insured employ-
ers,80 business coalitions,81 and union trusts82 may contract directly with
individual providers or members of a provider network to form preferred
provider arrangements. Self-insured employee benefit plans may purchase
"stop loss" insurance coverage to fund claims that exceed the limit of its
financial resources8 3 or may retain an insurance company on an administra-
tive services only basis. 84
D. Preferred Provider Health Benefit Plans
Selective provider contracting by an insurer offering a preferred provider
health benefit plan constitutes an alternate model for structuring preferred
provider arrangements. Commercial insurance companies, hospital and
medical service corporations, or public entities may initiate provider
contracting.
1. Commercial Insurance Plans
A commercial insurance carrier may enlist institutional and professional
health care providers on an individual basis or as members of existing pre-
ferred provider networks to render services to insureds at predetermined
78. Trombly, Administrative Information Services, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra
note 15, at 737, 740-41.
79. See TEXAS HOUSE OF REP. COMM. ON INS., THE IMPACT OF ERISA ON GROUP
HEALTH BENEFITS 1, n.2 (1985) (traces trend toward self-insured employee health benefit
plans).
80. See, e.g., B.N.A., BOTTOM LINE?, supra note 10, at 47 (case study of Humana Inc.
modified PPA health care plan for employees); Flagg, Case Study: The Stouffer Corp., in NEW
HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 1070, 1072-76 (case study of Stouffer Corp. medical
and dental PPA health care plan for employees); Hester & Wouters, supra note 18, at 575-613
(case study of Security Pacific Health Care Plan, PPA formed by Security Pacific National
Bank); see also Bradford, Anxious Employers Jump Feet First into PPOs, Bus. INS. July 22,
1985, at 28, 28-30 (overview of employer-based PPAs).
81. See, e.g., B.N.A., BOTTOM LINE? supra note 10, at 9, 9 (nine case studies of health
care coalition PPAs); Colasanto, Coalition Perspective, GROUP PRAC. J. May-June, 1984, at 16,
16-22 (case study of Community Care Network, PPA formed by San Diego Employers Health
Care Coalition); Weiner, The Politics of Building an Effective PPO Network, Bus. & HEALTH,
Mar. 1986, at 34, 34-37 (case study of South Florida Health Action Coalition PPA network
development).
82. See B.N.A., BOTTOM LINE? supra note 10, at 69 (case study of Team Care, PPA
formed by Teamsters Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare
Fund), 70 (case study of New Jersey Operating Engineers Local 825 PPA).
83. See Bradford, supra note 80, at 30.




rates.85 In exchange for the payment of monthly premiums, commercial in-
surers indemnify insureds in the event that they require health care serv-
ices. 8 6 Generally offered as an option to traditional fee-for-service indemnity
plans, preferred provider plans are structured to establish an incentive for
the use of preferred providers by featuring different benefit levels for services
obtained from preferred and nonpreferred providers.8 7 A commercial in-
surer may conduct its own utilization review.88 Alternatively, an insurer
may arrange for health care providers or third-party entities to conduct utili-
zation review.89
2. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans
Hospital and medical service corporations are nonprofit entities that en-
gage in direct contracting with health care providers for the provision of
hospital and medical services to their subscribers. 90 Hospital and medical
service corporations provide health care benefits to subscribers in exchange
for periodic payments. 91 Under the resulting arrangement, termed a service
benefit plan, providers obtain direct reimbursement from the third-party
payor.92 Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans represent notable examples of
these direct coverage service benefit plans.93 While Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans have engaged actively in non-selective provider contracting for
over fifty years, 94 the Blues have also undertaken a substantial role in the
development of selective provider contracting pursuant to preferred provider
arrangements.95
85. See Greenberg, Case Study: Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, in NEW
HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 1044, 1044-56 (case study of Preferred Plus, PPA
formed by Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company); Kastiel, Insurers Forming PPOs
to Meet Client's Demand, Bus. INS., July 22, 1985, at 24, 36 (comprehensive survey of Pruden-
tial, Metropolitan Life, Transamerican, and Aetna PPA activity).
86. See W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW §§ 2:3, :12 (1972 & Pam. Supp.
1987).
87. See C. VADAKIN & Z. LITTON, supra note 26, at 119.
88. See Kastiel, supra note 85, at 40 (discusses Precert, Aetna's utilization review
program).
89. Id. at 41 (discusses John Hancock utilization review program).
90. See 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 18:50 (rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter
COUCH]. Hospital and medical service corporations operate subject to strict state regulation
specifying acceptable benefits, provider contract terms, rate schedules, and corporate reserve
requirements. See Group Hospital Service Nonprofit Corporations Act, TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. arts. 20.01-.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988).
91. See 2 COUCH, supra note 90, § 18:50.
92. Id.
93. See BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ASS'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD ORGANIZATION (1987) (hereinafter BLUE CROSS & BLUE
SHIELD Q&A]. Blue Cross is comprised of 63 independent organizations that provide sub-
scribers with prepaid hospital and other institutional services, outpatient care, and home care.
Id. at 2. Blue Shield is comprised of 65 organizations that provide prepaid physician services
and may provide dental and vision services. Id.
94. Id. at 1, 4; see P. STARR, supra note 37, at 295-310 (chronicles "the birth of Blues,"
1929-1945).
95. See BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD Q&A, supra note 93, at 8-9. Fifty-six Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Plans, enrolling eight million persons, currently offer a preferred provider
product. Id. at 9; see also Gabel & Ermann, supria note 18, at 308-10 (survey indicates increase




In an effort to contain spiraling health care costs, 96 California enacted
legislation97 in 1982 that enabled Medi-Cal to negotiate contracts for the
inpatient care of its beneficiaries98 and allowed private insurers and Blue
Cross to contract with hospitals and physicians for "alternate rates of
pay." 99 Designed to promote competition in the market for health care serv-
ices, the California system for state-sponsored selected provider arrange-
ments legitimized the practice of direct contracting with health care
providers by entities that assume the financial risk of underwriting health
care benefits. lOO
Blues); Richman, Blues Cooperation, Innovation Key to Retaining Industry Position, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 31, 1986, at 40, 44-45 (analyzes Blues' competitive PPA development ac-
tivity). For an analysis of selected Blue Cross & Blue Shield PPAs, see Kastiel, supra note 85,
at 36 (discusses Preferred Care of Kansas City and Key Care of Virginia); Parcell, Case Study:
Blue Shield Preferred Plan-Blue Shield of California, in NEw HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra
note 15, at 1026, 1026-34 (case study of Blue Shield Preferred Plan).
96. Several factors contributed to the rise of selective contracting in response to the Cali-
fornia health care crisis, including: (1) 20% inflation in hospital costs; (2) the issuance of
health benefit policies by private insurers operating at losses; (3) requirements of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 that made waivers from Medicaid regulations requiring
freedom of choice easier to obtain; and (4) a deceased Medi-Cal budget resulting from a reduc-
tion in state tax revenues due to economic recession. Johns, Case Study: Selective Contracting
In California, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra note 15, at 948-49.
97. For a discussion of the politics surrounding the enactment of the Medi-Cal reform
package, see Bergthold, Crabs in a Bucket: The Politics of Health Care Reform in California, 9
J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 203, 206-15 (1984).
98. See Cal. A.B. 799, 1982 Leg. (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE) (establishing position of special negotiator appointed by governor
authorized to contract with hospitals for inpatient care of Medi-Cal beneficiaries); Cal. S.B.
2012, 1982 Leg. (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, CAL.
GOV'T CODE, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, CAL. INS. CODE, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE)
("clean up" bill exempts special negotiator from disclosure required for all state proceedings).
Assembly Bill 799 and Senate Bill 2012 called for the appointment of a special negotiator for
the term of one year who was accorded maximum discretion and flexibility to contract with
providers for inpatient care of Medi-Cal beneficiaries. For a chronology of the activities of the
"Medi-Cal Czar" see Johns, supra note 96, at 951.
99. See Cal. A.B. 3480, 1982 Leg. (codified in scattered sections of CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE, CAL. INS. CODE, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE) (overriding freedom of choice
provisions; insurers and Blue Cross authorized to negotiate and enter into contracts with hos-
pitals and physicians for alternate rates of pay).
100. See Melia, Competition in the Healthcare Marketplace. A Beginning in California, 308
NEw ENG. J. MED. 788, 788-92 (1983). For a comprehensive analysis of the origin, impact,
and policy implications of California's contracting legislation, refer to the series of reports
compiled by the National Governors Association and the John A. Hartford Foundation. NA-
TIONAL GOVERNORS Ass'N, SELECTIVE CONTRACTING FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN CALIFOR-
NIA: FIRST REPORT (1984) (addresses enabling legislation, first year of implementation, and
initial impact of legislation on hospitals and insurance companies); NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S
ASS'N, SELECTIVE CONTRACTING FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA: AN UPDATE
(1984) (addresses changes in Medi-Cal contracting, changes in legislation, and statistical
trends in hospital utilization, costs, and revenue); NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASS'N, SELECTIVE
CONTRACTING FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT (1985) (addresses
legislation, Round Two Medi-Cal Contracting, impact of contracting on hospital sector, health
insurance marketplace, employee benefits, and statewide health care delivery).
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IV. REGULATION OF PREFERRED PROVIDER HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules adopted by the State Board of
Insurance authorize commercial insurers to form preferred provider ar-
rangements and to offer insureds who obtain health care services from pre-
ferred providers an alternate level of coverage under preferred provider
health benefit plans.'01 Presently, twenty-six states have enacted statutes or
regulations that similarly enable insurers to issue preferred provider health
benefit plans. 10 2 To assist states that have not yet pursued independent legis-
lative or administrative action, the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners recently adopted model legislation that provides a framework for
the regulation of preferred provider arrangements and preferred provider
health benefit plans.10 3
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules attempt to facilitate the develop-
ment of preferred provider arrangements as an alternative health care fi-
101. For a discussion of the Texas Preferred Provider Plan rulemaking process, see supra
note 5.
102. Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85 (May 10, 1985); Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85A (July 18, 1985); CAL. INS.
CODE §§ 10133-10133.6, 10402-10402.1, 11512-11512.05, 14165-14165.10 (West 1972 & Supp.
1988); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §§ 2240-2240.4 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 626.9541(2),
627.6375, 627.6695 (West 1984 & Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982f-q (Smith-
Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, §§ 6501.10-.100 (1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-8-11-1 to -4 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.48(5)(a) (West 1988);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-231(a), (b)(3) (1986); KAN. INS. BULL. 1985-16 (June 24, 1985); 806
Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 18:020 (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2201-:2204 (West Supp. 1988);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2670-2679 (Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 354EE, 477FF (1986 & Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 550.51-.63 (West Supp.
1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20, subd. 15(4) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-22-1701 to 33-22-1707 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-4101 to -4113 (1984); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 420-C:1 to :7 (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57-16.1, 58-260.6 (Supp.
& Pam. Supp. 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-47-01 to 26.1-47-07 (Supp. 1987); OR. REV.
STAT. § 743.531(3) (Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 764a (Purdon Pam. Supp. 1988);
31 PA. CODE §§ 152.1-.25 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 36-5-14.3, 36-26-17.1, 36-
27A-23.1, 58-41-15.1 (Supp. 1988); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705 (1986); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.20, 628.36(2)(a) (West Supp. 1987); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 3.48(l)-(5) (1986);
WYO. STAT. §§ 26-22-501 to 26-22-503 (Supp. 1987); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988
Ga. Laws 1483 (to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-30-20 to -27) (applies to health benefit
plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989).
For recent compilations of state laws and regulations relating to preferred provider arrange-
ments, see AMERICAN ASS'N OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGS., STATE BY STATE LEGISLA-
TIVE OVERVIEW (1986); DEPT. OF STATE LEGIS., AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, SELECTED PPO
STATUTES (1985); R. HINDER & K. LEPAK, SUMMARY OF PPO LEGISLATION ON A STATE
LEVEL (1987) (prepared for AAPPO); OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, AMERICAN HosP. ASS'N,
LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 8, REGULATION OF PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS: A
LEGAL GUIDE FOR HOSPITAL EXECUTIVES (1986); E. ROLPH, J. RICH, P. GINSBURG, S.
HOSEK, K. KEENAN, & G. GERTLER, STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING PRE-
FERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (1986) [hereinafter FTC STUDY] (prepared by Rand
Corporation for Department of Health and Human Services and Federal Trade Commission).
103. See Preferred Provider Arrangements Model Act (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987)
[hereinafter referred to in text and notes as NAIC Model Act]; see also H.R. 733, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H167 (1985) (proposed federal legislation would have permitted
group health care payors to negotiate and contract for alternate rates of payment with health
care providers and to offer alternate rates to beneficiaries electing to receive services from
participating providers; legislation would have expressly overridden any conflicting state law
or regulation).
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nance and delivery system while protecting the interests of both providers
and consumers of health care services.1°4 To ensure broad provider partici-
pation, the Texas rules require insurers to offer all health care providers an
opportunity to participate in a preferred provider panel 0 5 and prescribe ac-
ceptable preferred provider contract terms and conditions. 0 6 To protect in-
sureds from discrimination and to guarantee freedom of provider choice, the
rules limit the differential in benefits applicable to health care services ren-
dered by preferred and nonpreferred providers 10 7 and regulate provider re-
ferral 0 8 and emergency service delivery protocol. 0 9 Furthermore, the rules
require that preferred provider arrangements set forth specific complaint res-
olution procedures" 0 and incorporate a series of other consumer protection
measures.I1" Finally, in a direct effort to promote the delivery of high qual-
ity, cost-effective health care services for the benefit of both providers and
consumers, the rules set forth guidelines for provider participation in utiliza-
tion review' 12 and quality assurance procedures."13
A. Scope of the Regulation
The State Board of Insurance limited the scope of the Texas Preferred
Provider Plan Rules to preferred provider health benefit plans based on con-
tracts between commercial insurers' 14 and health care providers. 15 Pre-
ferred provider networks that contract with certain health care purchasers,
preferred provider arrangements sponsored by third-party entities and self-
insured labor organizations or employers, and preferred provider health ben-
efit plans sponsored by health care service corporations and public entities
fall outside the scope of the Texas rules. 1 6 The rules apply only to group
health insurance policies" 7 that permit insureds to receive a higher level of
coverage for health care services obtained from preferred professional and
institutional providers. 1 8
104. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705 (1986). For an analysis of the final ver-
sion of the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules prepared immediately prior to their publica-
tion in the Texas Register, see Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein, Texas State Board of Insurance
Adopts New Rules Governing Insured Preferred Provider Plans, TEXAS ALERT (June 16, 1986)
[hereinafter WLE TEXAS ALERT].
105. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3703(1), (3), 3.3704(8) (1986).
106. Id. § 3.3703(2).
107. Id. § 3.3704(1).
108. Id. §§ 3.3703(3), 3.3704(4).
109. Id. § 3.3704(4).
110. Id. § 3.3705(2).
111. Id. § 3.3704(5), (6).
112. Id. § 3.3705(4).
113. Id. § 3.3705(3).
114. See id. § 3,3702 (insurer includes any life, health, accident, or health and accident
insurance company authorized to issue or deliver health insurance policies approved under art.
3.422 of Insurance Code).
115. See id. (preferred provider includes physician, nonphysician practitioner, hospital or
other institutional provider, or organization of physicians or health care providers). The rules
specifically prohibit the formation of dental care PPAs. See id. § 3.3701.
116. Id. § 3.3701.
117. See id. § 3.3702.
118. Id. § 3.3701.
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Preferred provider statutes and regulations adopted by other states vary in
scope. PPA enabling provisions in five other states similarly apply only to
insurance.1 19 Provisions in certain other states apply to insurers and either
third-party administrators, 120 health service corporations,12 1 or both third-
party administrators and health service corporations.122 In addition to these
PPAs, preferred provider statutes in eight states also regulate preferred pro-
vider arrangements sponsored by fraternal benefit societies 123 and HMOs. 124
Health care purchaser-sponsored preferred provider arrangements are regu-
lated in a nonuniform manner. Several states expressly subject PPAs spon-
sored by employers and labor organizations to regulation.125 Certain other
states' PPA statutes expressly exclude employers and organizations exempt
from state insurance regulation under the terms of the Employee Retirement
Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA). 126 Sponsoring entities that fall
within the scope of the NAIC Model Act include insurers, health care service
119. Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85 (May 10, 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3 (Bums 1986 &
Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 515.48(5)(a) (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72A.20, subd. 15(4) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.531(3) (Supp. 1987).
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-231 (Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617 (1986).
121. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988) (commercial insurance compa-
nies); 806 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 18:020 § 1(3) (1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477FF (1986
& Supp. 1987) (insurer); id. § 354EE (nonprofit health service plans); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 420-C:1(IV) (Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-260.6 (Pam. Supp. 1987) (insurers); id.
§ 57-16.1 (Supp. 1987) (hospital, medical and dental service corporations); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3407 (1986) (insurer); id. § 38.2-4209 (nonstock corporation); Wyo. STAT. § 26-22-502
(Supp. 1987).
122. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 982i (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672 (Supp. 1987) (insurers and administrators); id. tit. 24, § 2335 (nonprofit
service organizations); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.520) (West Supp. 1988).
123. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1703(5) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4103 (1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.147-01(4) (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 609.01(4) (West Supp.
1987); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1484 (to be codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-30-22(3)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or
after Jan. 1, 1989).
124. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1703(5) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4103 (1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-01(4) (Supp. 1987); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga.
Laws 1483, 1484 (to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-22(3)) (applies to health benefit
plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989).
125. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6695 (Supp. 1988) (insurers, including any self-insurer);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(3) (West Supp. 1988) (group purchasers, including insurers,
self-funded organizations, Taft-Hartley trusts, employers, health care financiers, third-party
administrators, providers, or other intermediaries); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4105 (1984) (par-
ticipants in an insurance arrangement, including any employer, union, or other organization
providing health care services or benefits to its employees or members through an insurance
arrangement).
126. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.)
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, $ 982j (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988) (self-insured employers, em-
ployee benefit trust funds, other ERISA exempt organizations, and State of Illinois exempt
from any provisions related to preferred provider arrangement); MD. ANN. CODE. tit. 48-A,
§ 477FF(d) (1986) (employee benefit plans regulated by federal law or ERISA not subject to
provisions related to preferred provider arrangements); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 764a (Pur-
don Pam. Supp. 1988) (preferred provider organizations that assume financial risk and regu-
lated under ERISA required to file certificate acknowledging ERISA governance with
Insurance Commissioner); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1487 (to be
codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-23(d)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or
renewed after Jan. 1, 1989).
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corporations, HMOs, and fraternal benefit societies. 127 An optional provi-
sion contained in the NAIC Model Act facilitating verification of the PPA
activities of noninsurance entities exempts employer PPA sponsors from fil-
ing requirements. 128
B. Terms and Conditions of Provider Participation
Provisions contained in the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules relating
to the assembly of preferred provider panels and the criteria for panel mem-
bership attempt to ensure that the preferred provider contracting process
promotes broad provider participation. The Texas Preferred Provider Plan
Rules require insurers to offer all physicians and health care providers that
comply with the terms and conditions of provider participation a fair and
reasonable opportunity to become members of a preferred provider panel. 129
Preferred provider plan rules in certain other states similarly guarantee pre-
ferred status to any professional or institutional provider that agrees to com-
ply with the provider participation requirements.130 Rules adopted by two
states protect only the participation of professional providers. 131 Moreover,
rules adopted in certain other states protect the providers' rights to apply for
preferred provider panel membership, but do not guarantee participation. 132
The provider participation provisions set forth in the Texas Preferred Pro-
vider Plan Rules encompass both physicians and nonphysician practition-
ers. 133 The Texas Insurance Code specifically prohibits discrimination
against certain classes of health care practitioners.1 3 4 Accordingly, the
127. NAIC Model Act § 3(E) (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987).
128. Id. § 4(C) & drafting note.
129. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986).
130. Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85 (May 10, 1985), as amended by Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85A (July 18,
1985) (membership on provider panels must be open to all practitioners willing and able to
meet terms and conditions of organization); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3(c) (Burns 1986) (no
hospital, physician, pharmacist, or other designated provider may be denied right to enter
preferred provider agreement); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617 (1986) (any health care pro-
vider who is willing to meet terms and conditions established by insurer for designation as
preferred health care provider shall be eligible to apply for and receive preferred provider
status); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407B (1986) (no physician, hospital, or nonphysical practi-
tioner willing to meet terms and conditions of preferred provider contract shall be excluded);
see "also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1487-88 (to be codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-30-25) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or after Jan.
1, 1989) (all health care providers within defined service area who satisfy standards set forth by
insurer must be given opportunity to apply and to become preferred provider).
131. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982h (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988) (insurer shall not
refuse to contract with any noninstitutional provider who meets terms and conditions estab-
lished by insurer or administrator); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(c) (West Supp. 1988)
(no licensed provider, other than hospital, who meets terms and conditions of preferred pro-
vider contract may be denied right to preferred provider status).
132. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(2) (West Supp. 1988) (organizations shall grant
interested health care providers located in geographic area served by organization opportunity
to apply for membership on panel); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-260.6(c) (Pam. Supp. 1987) (any
professional or institutional provider shall be allowed opportunity to submit proposal for par-
ticipation in preferred provider plan; providers may be permitted to participate at discretion of
preferred provider plan).
133. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986).




Texas rules compel insurers offering preferred provider plans that cover
services delivered by certain nonphysician practitioners to afford both physi-
cians and nonphysician practitioners an equivalent opportunity to partici-
pate as preferred providers.135 Preferred provider plan rules in seven other
states also protect the panel membership interests of nonphysician practi-
tioners. 136 In contrast, preferred provider plan rules in two states stipulate
that although insurers must open panel membership application to nonphy-
sician practitioners, insurers may selectively contract with providers who ap-
ply.137 To facilitate professional provider application and participation, the
Texas rules require insurers to notify all practitioners in the geographic area
covered by the plan of the opportunity to participate in the preferred pro-
vider panel. 138
To promote the participation of a broad range of institutional health care
providers, 139 the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules require that insurers
offering preferred provider plans make a good faith effort to recruit a mix of
for-profit, nonprofit, and tax-supported facilities. 14 Furthermore, the rules
mandate that insurers give special consideration to teaching hospitals and
hospitals that treat a large number of indigent or uninsured patients. '1 The
rules fail, however, to require insurers to notify institutional providers of
panel formation.
135. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.703(3) (1986).
136. See Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85A (July 18, 1985) (amends Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85 (May 10, 1985)
to comply with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3212 (1980)) (preferred provider panel membership
must be open not only to professionals licensed under Medical Practice Act, but also to li-
censed optometrists, podiatrists, psychologists, and dentists); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3
(Burns 1986) (providers designated as mandated providers may not be denied right to enter
into agreement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:2(V) (Supp. 1987) (insurers may contract
with providers licensed to deliver health care services, including medical, surgical, pharmaceu-
tical, podiatric, psychological, and nursing services); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-5-14.3 (Supp.
1988) (chiropractors may organize or contract for services with corporation organized by li-
censed practitioners of healing acts for purpose of negotiating group health care contracts and
providing services with alternative health care delivery systems, including preferred provider
organizations); id. § 36-26-17.1 (social workers); id. § 36-26-23.1 (psychologists); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 3 1A-22-617(7) (1986) (any health care provider licensed to treat any illness or inquiry
within scope of his practice who is willing and able to meet terms and conditions of provider
participation shall be eligible to receive preferred provider designation); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3407(C) (1986) (podiatrists, chiropodists, optometrists, opticians, psychologists, clinical
social workers, and chiropractors shall possess same opportunity to qualify for payment as
preferred providers as doctors of medicine); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.87(1) (West 1980 & Supp.
1988) (insurers may not refuse to provide or pay for benefits for health care services provided
by licensed health care professional because services not rendered by physician). But see
MoNr. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1704 (1987) (insurers not required to negotiate or enter into
agreements with any specific provider or class of providers).
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 550.53(6), (1) (West Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 44-4110, 44-4112 (1984).
138. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986) (requires publication or written notice of
preferred provider panel formation); accord MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(4) (West
Supp. 1988) (organization agrees to notify health care providers of panel formation); see also
28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986) (insurer must provide noncontracting practitioners
notice and opportunity to participate on annual basis).
139. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3702 (1986) (institutional provider definition includes hos-
pital, nursing home, and any other medical or health-related service facility).
140. Id. § 3.3704(8).
141. Id.
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Permissible terms and conditions for preferred provider participation
under the Texas rules include economic, quality, and accessibility considera-
tions. 142 Practice privileges at preferred hospitals or institutions also consti-
tute a valid condition of participation for professional providers, unless no
preferred hospital or facility extends privileges to a particular provider
class.143 Preferred provider plan rules in other states recognize negotiated
price differences,' 4 price differences based on geographical area,' 4 5 market
conditions, method of payment or patient mix, 146 and specialty 147 and non-
price related considerations including quality of care,14 8 availability of serv-
ices, 149 location, 150 profession,' 5' specialization, 52 professional privi-
leges,153 and projected utilization,154 as valid provider selection criteria. The
NAIC Model Act similarly recognizes negotiated price differences, quality of
care, and availability of services as *valid bases for provider participation de-
cisions.' 55 Certain other states' provisions set forth less specific selection
guidelines including compliance with reasonable terms and conditions estab-
lished by the insurer independently or as a product of PPA contract
negotiations.15 6
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules also identify certain participa-
tion criteria for institutional providers. Under the rules, an insurer may con-
dition its decision to extend preferred institutional provider status on
economic, quality, and accessibility considerations. 57 For certain types of
facilities, insurers may also consider geographic, economic, or operational
142. Id. § 3.3703(2).
143. Id.
144. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982h (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672 (Supp. 1987).
145. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982h (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 27-8-11-3 (Bums 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672 (Supp. 1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-4111 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B) (1986).
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4111 (1984).
147. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982h (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 27-8-11-3 (Bums 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672 (Supp. 1987); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-4111 (1984).
148. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-04 (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628.36(2)(b) (Supp.
1987).
149. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984).
150. Id.; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 550.53(9) (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:5 (Supp. 1987).
151. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4110 (1984).
152. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4110 (1984).
153. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:5 (Supp. 1987). Contra MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-
1705(b)(2) (1987) (insurers may not require hospital staff privileges as criteria for preferred
provider designation).
154. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(1) (West Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-4110 (1984).
155. NAIC Model Act § 6 (National Ass'n Ins. Commr's 1987).
156. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477FF(b)(2) (1986); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 550.53(1) (West Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-167 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.20 (West Supp. 1987).
157. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(2) (1986).
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factors.' 58 PPA provisions in other states permit insurers to condition pre-
ferred institutional provider status on negotiated price differences,' 5 9 price
differences based on geographic area, 160 market condition,161 method of pay-
ment, and patient mix' 62 and non-price related factors such as quality of
care,' 63 location,164 and projected utilization.1 65 Under the NAIC Model
Act, insureds may condition preferred institutional provider status on negoti-
ated price differences, quality of care, and availability of services. 166
Pursuant to the Texas rules, insurers may neither unreasonably withhold
preferred provider status from physicians or health care providers willing to
comply with the terms and conditions of participation 67 nor prevent profes-
sional or institutional providers from participating in other preferred pro-
vider plans, health maintenance organizations, or other types of insurance
plans.' 68 For physicians denied preferred provider status, the rules require
that insurers provide an appeal mechanism.' 69 Specifically, the rules make
an insurer's decision to withhold preferred provider status from a physician
subject to review by a three-member physician panel selected by the insurer
from a list of contracting physicians supplied by preferred physician provid-
ers.170 For nonphysician practitioners denied preferred provider status, no
specific course of appeal exists under the rules. Furthermore, although the
rules permit insurers to deny preferred provider status to hospital and other
institutional providers that reserve staff privileges only for practitioners
under contract with a preferred provider panel, 17' the rules fail to provide a
review mechanism for hospital and other institutional providers denied pre-
ferred status. 172
158. Id. § 3.3704(8).
159. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3 (Bums 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2172
(Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477FF(cc) (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B)
(1986).
160. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3 (Bums 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477FF(c) (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4111
(1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B) (1986).
161. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477FF(c) (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4111 (1984);
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B) (1986).
162. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4111 (1984).
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-04 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.36(2)(b) (Supp.
1987).
164. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(9) (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 420-C:5 (Supp. 1987).
165. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(1) (West Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-4110 (1984).
166. NAIC Model Act § 6 (National Ass'n Ins. Commr's 1987).
167. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986).
168. Id. § 3.3704(2); accord MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(8) (West Supp. 1988);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-260.6(f) (Pam. Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.36(2)(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1987).
169. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 3.3703(2).
172. See WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra note 104, at 4.
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C. Preferred Provider Health Care Benefits
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules regulate the amount of leverage
that insurers may exercise in implementing health care finance and delivery
systems designed to channel insureds to preferred providers. Certain provi-
sions contained in the Texas Insurance Code that safeguard insureds from
discrimination and guarantee freedom of provider selection form the statu-
tory basis for these protective regulations. First, the Texas Insurance Code
categorically prohibits commercial insurers from discriminating among in-
sureds in the amount of health insurance premium, the level of health insur-
ance benefits payable under a policy, and the terms and conditions of the
insurance contract. 173 Statutory prohibitions against unfair discrimination
among insureds are derived from the principle that premium and benefit
levels constitute a function of the degree of risk associated with a particular
class of individuals. 174 Based on this premise, individuals that represent the
same degree of risk to the insurer belong to the same class of insureds., 7 5 To
ensure compliance with these fundamental principles, unfair discrimination
statutes require insurers to assess uniform premium payments and policy
benefits to members of the same class of insureds. 176 Second, the Texas In-
surance Code enjoins commercial insurers from restricting an insured's right
to obtain treatment from the health care provider of his choice by making
benefits payable for health care services under any insurance plan contingent
upon obtaining services from a particular professional or institutional pro-
vider.177 Freedom of provider choice provisions protect the interests of in-
173. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(7)(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988).
174. See 5 COUCH, supra note 90, §§ 30:3, 30:11, 30:15.
175. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(7)(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988); Reeves
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(variation in benefits under insurance policy for different classes of individuals not unfair
discrimination).
176. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(7)(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988). For an
analysis of the purpose and operation of unfair discrimination statutes, see 5 COUCH, supra
note 90, §§ 30:48-:51, 30:55.
177. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6, § 3 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988) (accident and
sickness insurance policy may not require that service be rendered by particular hospital or
person); id. art. 3.70-2(B) (health insurance benefits may not be contingent upon treatment by
particular practitioner, unless the policy designates practitioners whom insurer will recognize
and those whom insurer will not recognize); id. art. 21.35A (health insurance benefit plan that
covers services within scope of practice of licensed psychologist must provide reimbursement
for services whether performed by licensed doctor of medicine or licensed psychologist); id.
art. 21.52, § 3 (insured may select licensed doctor of podiatric medicine, doctor of chiroprac-
tic, or doctor of optometry to perform medical or surgical services covered by health insurance
benefit plan or audiologist or speech-language pathologist to perform hearing and speech re-
lated health services covered by health insurance plan; health insurance benefit plan that cov-
ers such health care services may not classify, differentiate, or otherwise discriminate in
payment for such services when performed by such practitioners). For an analysis of the pur-
pose and operation of freedom of choice statutes, see W. MEYER, supra note 86, § 18:1-:3.
In 1985 at the request of the Chairman of the State Board of Insurance, the Texas Attorney
General reviewed several proposed insurance policy provisions that excluded certain types of
practitioners from coverage based on express provisions and "place and manner" restrictions.
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-301, at 1359 (1985). Based on an analysis of the statutes and
legislative history, the Attorney General determined that the Texas Insurance Code freedom of
choice provisions applied to health care services (1) rendered by podiatrists, dentists, chiro-
practors, optometrists, audiologists, speech-language pathologists and psychologists, (2) coy-
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sureds in obtaining reimbursement for health care services rendered by
physicians and other types of health care professionals in a variety of treat-
ment settings.1 7 8 Freedom of choice provisions also protect the interests of
health care providers in delivering services to insured patients. 179
In apparent conflict with unfair discrimination and freedom of choice pro-
visions, preferred provider insurance contracts classify and reimburse in-
sureds on the basis of provider selection, rather than level of risk.' 80 The
Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules explicitly state that the Commissioner
of Insurance shall not consider health insurance policy terms that conform
with the rules to constitute unfair discrimination among insureds18' or an
unlawful restriction on the insured's freedom of choice in the selection of a
professional or institutional provider.' 82 To permit commercial insurers to
issue preferred provider policies featuring differential benefit levels based on
the insured's choice of provider, the rules contain certain other provisions
drafted to reconcile preferred provider health care finance and delivery
mechanisms with Insurance Code provisions relating to unfair discrimina-
tion and freedom of provider choice.' 8 3
Provisions contained in the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules that
limit differential benefit levels offered under the PPA health care finance sys-
tem attempt to eliminate both express and constructive interference with an
insured's provider choice.' 8 4 Specifically, rules stipulate that benefits for
preferred provider services may not exceed an amount thirty percent higher
than benefits for nonpreferred provider services.' 85 The rules also stipulate
that the deductible applicable to reimbursement for services obtained from
nonpreferred providers be reasonable in comparison to the preferred pro-
vider deductible.18 6
The NAIC Model Act' 87 and preferred provider plan rules in other
ered by the relevant policy, and (3) within the scope of the affected practitioner's license or
certification. Id. at 1362. The Attorney General warned that interference with an insured's
autonomy of provider choice may arise both from policy provisions that expressly discriminate
against certain providers and from provisions that have a discriminatory purpose or effect. Id.
at 1363. Accordingly, the Attorney General ruled that a health insurance policy provision
that limited benefits to services rendered by a physician and a provision that limited the dollar
amount of benefits and the number of covered treatments for services rendered by a chiroprac-
tor and a psychologist directly discriminated against one or more of the affected practitioners.
Id. at 1362. The Attorney General further ruled that a policy provision restricting benefits for
chiropractic services to those services performed in a hospital or while the insured is under
general anesthesia indirectly discriminated against practitioners precluded by the scope of their
licenses from performing services in the prescribed place and manner. Id. at 1363.
178. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-301, at 1361.
179. Id.
180. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3701 (1986).
181. Id. § 3.3703.
182. Id. § 3.3704.
183. See supra note 177.
184. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-301, at 1363.
185. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3704(1) (1986).
186. Id.; accord N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:4(III) (Supp. 1987).
187. NAIC Model Act § 5(B) (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987) (differences in benefit
levels payable to preferred and nonpreferred providers may be no greater than necessary to
provide reasonable incentive for insureds to use preferred provider).
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states 8" protect the insured's freedom of choice by specifying a similar cap
on the insurer's channeling leverage. The autonomy of the insured is less
protected in the remaining states. Certain states allow the insurer to exercise
discretionary leverage by requiring only that insurers provide insureds some
coverage for services obtained from nonpreferred providers.189 Certain
other states fail to set forth minimum coverage levels for services rendered
by nonpreferred providers.190
By authorizing insurers to issue exclusive provider plans, preferred prov-
188. Five states limit the difference in benefits payable to insureds who obtain services from
preferred and nonpreferred providers. Ark. Ins. Bull. 9-85 (May 10, 1985) (25% benefit differ-
ential limit); 806 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 18:020, § 2 (1986) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-
A, § 2677 (Supp. 1987) (20% benefit differential limit); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-03 (Supp.
1987) (differences in benefit levels payable to preferred and nonpreferred providers may be no
grater than necessary to provide reasonable incentive for insured to use preferred provider);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 3 1A-22-617(2)(d) (1986) (annual deductible applicable to reimbursement
for services obtained from nonpanel provider limited to $100 per person and $300 per family);
see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1485 (to be codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-30-23(b)(3)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or after
Jan. 1, 1989) (20% coinsurance differential limit); id. at 1486 (to be codified at § 33-30-
23(b)(4)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989)
(30% limit on differential between nonpreferred and basic benefit levels). PPA enabling provi-
sions in four states limit the percentage by which insurers may reduce the amount of reim-
bursement payable to nonpreferred providers relative to that payable to preferred providers.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 477FF(b)(4) (1986) (payment for services rendered by nonpre-
ferred providers may not be less than 85% of amount that would be paid to preferred provid-
ers for similar services in same geographic area, unless insurer demonstrates to Insurance
Commissioner that alternate level and payment more appropriate under circumstances);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1706(l)(a) (1987) (payment difference for reimbursement of pre-
ferred provider may not exceed 25% of preferred provider reimbursement level); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-260.6(d) (Pam. Supp. 1987) (payment for services delivered by nonparticipating
providers may not be reduced by more than 20% of payments applicable to participants prov-
iders); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617(2)(b) (1986) (insurer shall reimburse insured for at
least 75 % of average amount paid for comparable services of preferred health care providers of
same class); see Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1486 (to be codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-30-23(c)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or
after Jan. 1, 1989) (payments or reimbursement for covered pharmaceutical or dental services
must be same for preferred and nonpreferred providers, but not greater than provider's actual
fee).
189. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4113 (1984) (insurers shall provide for payment for serv-
ices rendered by nonpreferred providers who have not negotiated contract with insurer; in-
sured may be held financially responsible for charges of nonpreferred in excess of benefits
available under preferred provider plan); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(D) (1986) (preferred
provider policies shall provide payment for services rendered by nonpreferred providers, but
payments need not be same as for preferred providers).
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(2) (West Supp. 1988) (insurers may limit payments
under policies issued pursuant to agreements with insureds; insurers must offer benefits of
alternate rates to insureds who select designated providers); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73,
982i(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988) (insurer may issue policies that include incentives
for insured to utilize services of contract providers); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3 (Bums
1986) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-231(b) (1968) (insurers may offer alternate rates of pay-
ment to insureds who select contract providers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(5)(b) (West
Supp. 1988) (preferred provider agreement may include incentives that encourage insured em-
ployee or member to utilize preferred provider); id. § 40:2203(C) (group purchaser members
shall be guaranteed access to standard benefit under their policy whether they choose preferred
or nonpreferred provider); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 764a (Purdon Pam. Supp. 1988) (insurer
may issue policies that include incentives for insured to use contract provider); Wyo. STAT.
§ 26-22-503(a)(ii)(A), (B) (Supp. 1987) (policies issued pursuant to preferred provider agree-
ments may include incentives for insured and limit reimbursement for health care services).
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iders plan rules in six states allow the insurer to exercise absolute channeling
leverage.19 ' An optional provision set forth in the NAIC Model Act similarly
authorizes insurers to issue preferred provider health benefit plans pursuant
to exclusive provider arrangements. 192 Under an exclusive provider plan,
insurers offer no coverage to insureds who obtain health care services from
nonpreferred providers. 19 3 Preferred provider plan rules in certain states,
including Texas, expressly proscribe exclusive provider plans. 194
D. Open Panel Health Care Services Delivery
Four provisions contained in the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules re-
lating to access to practitioners and referral protocol under the PPA health
care delivery system seek to further prevent interference with the insured's
freedom of provider choice. First, the rules require that preferred provider
plans guarantee insureds direct and reasonable access to professional provid-
ers of all classes, specialty care services, and adequately staffed health care
facilities. 195 Second, the rules provide that preferred provider plans may not
require that an insured gain access to the system by referral from a practi-
tioner of another class or by a subspecialist of the same class.' 96 Conse-
quently, the rules preclude insurers from using primary care physician
gatekeepers to direct the delivery of health care services under preferred pro-
vider arrangements. 197 Third, the rules expressly guarantee each insured the
right to the treatment and diagnostic techniques prescribed by the insured's
practitioner.198 If certain health care services are not available through pre-
ferred providers, the rules permit insureds to obtain services from an appro-
priate nonpreferred provider and require insurers to reimburse insureds for
the services rendered by the nonpreferred provider at the preferred rate. 199
191. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, §§ 2240(f), 2240.4 (1984) (exclusive provider includes
any institution or health care professional rendering exclusive services to covered persons pur-
suant to contract with insurer to provide services at alternate rates); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-
11-3(a)(3) (Bums 1986) (insurer may issue policies that provide reimbursement for expenses
only if service is rendered by contract provider); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 550.3405(2)
(West Supp. 1988) (insurer may offer policies that condition coverage on insured's election to
obtain services from providers who have entered into purchase agreements, if insurer also
offers insured option of enlisting in nonexclusive policy); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-
C:3(III) (Supp. 1987) (insurer may issue policies that provide benefit only if preferred provider
renders health care services); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 764a(c) (Purdon Pam. Supp. 1988)
(insurer may issue policies that reimburse only if contract provider or physician renders health
care services).
192. NAIC Model Act § 9 drafting note (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987) (if state elects
to permit exclusive provider arrangements and if arrangement satisfies standards for availabil-
ity and adequacy of services, legislation may permit insurers to provide benefits only if pre-
ferred provider renders health care services).
193. See supra notes 191-92. Exclusive provider health benefit plans generally cover emer-
gency services rendered by nonexclusive providers. FTC STUDY, supra note 102; see infra note
208.
194. 806 Ky. ADMIN. REGS. 18:020 (1986); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(2) (1986).
195. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3703(3), 3.3705.
196. Id. § 3.3703(3).
197. See WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra note 104, at 4.
198. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(1) (1986).
199. Id. § 3.3704(4).
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Whether or not prescribed health care services are available through a pre-
ferred provider, the rules further specify that insurers offering preferred pro-
vider plans must allow participating providers to refer an insured to
nonparticipating providers, if the participating provider informs the insured
that a different schedule of benefits may apply.20° Finally, the rules specifi-
cally address the contingency of emergency care delivery by a nonpreferred
provider. Under the rules, if an insured requires emergency medical serv-
ices201 and is unable to obtain the necessary services from a preferred pro-
vider, the insured may seek care from a nonpreferred provider.20 2
Moreover, the insurer must reimburse the insured at the preferred rate until
the insured can be safely transferred to the care of a preferred provider.203
Preferred provider statutes and regulations enacted in other states facili-
tate open panel health care service delivery in varying degrees. PPA's provi-
sions expressly guarantee an insured's access to preferred health care
personnel and facilities. 2°4 Coordinated gatekeeper referral is authorized in
two states205 and proscribed in two states.2°6 Provisions authorizing referral
to nonpreferred providers in nonemergency cases constitute a part of only
one other state's PPA health care service delivery scheme. 207 In contrast,
several states' rules provide for the delivery of health care services in case of
emergency.208 The NAIC Model Act requires PPA sponsors to assure rea-
200. Id. § 3.3705(1).
201. The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules. fail to include a specific definition of emer-
gency medical services. But cf CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240(e) (1984) (emergency
health care services defined); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, T 982g(h) (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp.
1988) (emergency health care services defined). See also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga.
Laws 1483, 1484 (to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-22) (applies to health benefit plans
issued, delivered, or renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989) (emergency health care services defined).
The NAIC Model Act proposes a comprehensive definition of emergency health care services.
See NAIC Model Act § 3(D) (National Ass'n Ins. Commr's 1987) (emergency care defined to
include covered services obtained by insured suffering accidental bodily injury or medical con-
dition requiring immediate medical care under circumstances or at location which reasonably
precludes insured from obtaining services from preferred provider).
202. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3704(4) (1986).
203. Id.
204. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982i(a)
(Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-4 (Bums 1986); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2673(1) (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(1) (West Supp.
1988); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 3.48(5) (1986).
205. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240(k) (1984) (primary care physician responsible for
providing initial primary care, ensuring continuity of patient care, and initiating referral for
specialist care); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 609.05(3) (West Supp. 1987) (preferred provider plan may
require enrollee to obtain referral from designated primary provider to other select providers).
206. IND. CODE § 27-8-11-3(d) (1986) (insurer may not deny or limit reimbursement to
insured because insured was not referred to preferred provider by person acting on behalf of or
under agreement with insurer); Wyo. STAT. § 26-22-503(b) (Supp. 1987) (same).
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-03(1)(b) (Supp. 1987).
208. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982 (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:2203(E) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(11) (West Supp. 1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-1705(a) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-03(1)(a) (Supp.
1987); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1487 (to be codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-30-24(1)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or
after Jan. 1, 1989); cf. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1(a)(5) (1984) (coverage on indem-
nity or provision of service basis for emergency services rendered outside service area pursuant
to exclusive provider group benefit plan).
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sonable access to services covered by a preferred provider health benefit
plan.20 9 The model legislation neither permits nor proscribes gatekeeper
control mechanisms and addresses nonpreferred provider care only in the
emergency context. 210
E. Utilization Review
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules permit insurers to conduct utili-
zation review designed to monitor the cost and appropriateness of expending
health care resources and to correct any departure from professionally rec-
ognized levels of service delivery. 211 By dictating that an insurer may not
require a physician to cover the costs of unnecessary procedures, 21 2 how-
ever, the rules prohibit insurers from employing utilization review mecha-
nisms that establish a direct correlation between a physician's decision to
treat and the assessment of a financial penalty or reward. Instead, the rules
provide for physician-controlled utilization review.213 Specifically, the rules
require that a physician or physicians, selected by the insurer from a list of
physicians supplied by the provider panel, approve all actions by an insurer
to correct a deviation from prescribed utilization patterns or to deny pay-
ment for a physician's services in the course of utilization review.214
Provisions relating to the utilization of referral providers and the alloca-
tion of PPA cost savings similarly separate medical and economic considera-
tions. First, the rules specifically prohibit insurers from rewarding a
physician for not referring a patient to a specialist or for not treating a par-
ticular condition.215 Second, the rules prohibit insurers from requiring the
referring provider to bear the expense of specialty care referral into or out of
the preferred provider panel.216 Finally, the rules stipulate that preferred
professional providers may only share savings from the cost-effective utiliza-
tion of health care resources in the aggregate. 217
PPA statutes in three other states permit, but do not require, insurers to
conduct utilization review.218 The NAIC Model Act 219 and certain other
state statutes 220 require insurers to implement some form of cost contain-
209. NAIC Model Act § 4(A)(3) (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987).
210. Id. § 5(A)(1).
211. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3702,.3.3705(4) (1986).
212. Id. § 3.3703(2). But see id. (preferred provider may agree with insurer not to bill
insured for care determined medically unnecessary by utilization review panel). For a discus-
sion of guarantees against balanced billing as an incentive to use preferred providers, see supra
note 47.
213. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(4) (1986).
214. Id.
215. Id. § 3.3703(3). For further discussion of the open referral protocol advocated by the
rules, see supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
216. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(3) (1986).
217. Id.
218. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3(a)(1) (1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2202(e)(i)
(West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 420-C:3(b), (c) (Supp. 1987).
219. NAIC Model Act § 4(A)(2) (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987).
220. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-02(1)(b) (Supp. 1987); see also Act effective July 1, 1988,
1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1486 (to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-23(a)(3)) (applied to
health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989).
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ment system that may include utilization review. PPA statutes in five states
advocate mandatory utilization review. 221
F Quality Assurance Procedures
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules permit, but do not require, in-
surers to conduct a periodic assessment of the quality of the health care
services delivered under preferred provider plans.222 Accordingly, the Texas
rules identify quality assessment as an optional mechanism that an insurer
may utilize to evaluate, monitor, or improve the quality and effectiveness of
medical care delivered by physicians pursuant to preferred provider health
benefit plans.223 If an insurer elects to conduct quality assessment, the Texas
rules stipulate that the objective of the assessment should be to ensure that
care delivered under the plan is consistent with that delivered by an ordi-
nary, reasonable, and prudent physician under the same or similar circum-
stances. 224 To facilitate that objective, the rules require that insurers engage
a three-member panel of physicians selected from a list of participating phy-
sicians supplied by the provider panel to conduct quality assessment
procedures. 225
In contrast to the Texas rules, statutes and regulations adopted in four
states regard quality assurance activities as a mandatory component of an
operational preferred provider arrangement. 226 Preferred provider statutes
in three states set forth comprehensive guidelines regulating the structure
and operation of acceptable quality assurance programs. 227 One PPA stat-
221. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133(d) (West Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, 982n
(Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2678 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 550.53(5) (West Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. § 764a(e) (Purdon Pam. Supp.
1988).
222. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3702, 3.3705(3) (1986).
223. Id. § 3.3702.
224. Id.
225. Id. § 3.3705(3).
226. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10133(d) (West Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 550.53(5) (West Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-04 (Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 764a(e) (Purdon Pam. Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617(4) (1986).
227. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133(d) (West Supp. 1988) (preferred provider contracts must
provide for continuous review of quality of care by independent professionally recognized third
party utilizing similarly licensed professionals to review each medical, dental, or psychological
service covered by plan); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(5) (West Supp. 1988) (requires
organization to conduct professional review of quality of health care delivery and performance
of health care personnel; organization must employ professionally recognized independent
third party to evaluate performance review program on biannual basis); id. § 550.53(3) (organ-
ization must submit proposed written standards for monitoring quality health care to Insur-
ance Commissioner before formation of initial provider panel); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-
617(4)(a) (1986) (insurers required to institute quality assurance program designed to ensure
that care delivered by contract providers is consistent with prevailing Utah standards); id.
§ 31A-22-617(4)(b) (Insurance Commissioner and Department of Health may designate quali-
fied persons to conduct annual audit of PPA quality assurance program); cf Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 628.36(2)(b)(4) (West Supp. 1987) (any health care plan may exclude provider from partici-
pation for cause related to professional practice); id. § 609.17 (preferred provider plan required




ute advocates nondelegated quality assurance review.228 Two statutes per-
mit delegated quality assurance review, but require a periodic independent
evaluation of the quality assurance program. 229
G. Administrative and Marketing Provisions
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules compel insurers marketing pre-
ferred provider health benefit plans to comply with a series of provisions
designed to protect the interests of insureds and providers. Specifically, the
rules require insurers to implement a protocol for the resolution of com-
plaints initiated by insureds and providers. 230 According to the rules, the
complaint resolution procedure must provide for reasonable due process
which includes advisory review by a physician panel selected from a list of
participating physicians supplied by the provider panel.2 31
In addition to complaint resolution procedures, the Texas Preferred Pro-
vider Plan Rules' consumer protection scheme stipulates that preferred pro-
vider health insurance policies and promotional materials clearly describe
the distinction between preferred and nonpreferred providers. 232 The rules
require that any description of preferred provider benefits appear in close
proximity to an equally prominent description of nonpreferred provider ben-
efits. 233 The rules also require insurers to supply prospective insureds with
an annually updated list of participating providers.234
Statutes and regulations enacted in certain other states contain compara-
ble administrative and marketing provisions. Preferred provider plan ad-
ministration provisions in four states incorporate complaint resolution
procedures. 235 Certain states impose comprehensive marketing restrictions
including annual mandatory disclosures to insureds, 236 annual distribution
228. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133(d) (Supp. 1988).
229. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.53(5) (West Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-
22-617(4)(b) (1986).
230. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(2) (1986).
231. Id. As a further mechanism for complaint resolution, the rules specifically recognize
the authority of the State Board of Insurance to investigate complaints of rules violations, to
conduct hearings and issue cease and desist orders and to enforce the rules governing preferred
provider health benefit plans in the same manner as other health insurance policies. Id.
§ 3.3703(4) (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988)).
232. Id. § 3.3704(5).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 73, 982m (Smith-Hurd Pam. Supp. 1988) (enrollee complaints
only); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 764a(e) (Purdon Pam. Supp. 1988) (enrollee complaints only);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617(5) (1986) (enrollee and provider complaints); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 609.15 (West Supp. 1987) (enrollee complaints only).
236. Cf. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.3(a)-(f) (1984) (emergency service coverage,
coverage for insured's dependents, limitations of exclusive provider arrangement, service area,
and identity of principal institutional and professional providers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 2675(2) (Supp. 1987) (identity of contract providers, extent of coverage, limitations or exclu-
sions of health care services, availability of reimbursement for insured unable to obtain pre-
ferred provider services, complaint process, preferred provider deductibles and coinsurance,
and rates of payment for services obtained from nonpreferred providers); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 550.53(10) (West Supp. 1988) (identity of organization contracting with provider
panel and identity of party sponsoring coverage); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-47-03(l)(c) (Supp.
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of a provider roster,237 registration with insurance authorities prior to offer-
ing preferred provider plans, 238 and annual reporting requirements. 239 The
NAIC Model Act administration and marketing scheme does not require in-
surers to institute compliant resolution procedures, but does require insurers
to disclose plan reimbursement terms to insureds24° and noninsurer pre-
ferred provider plan sponsors to register with insurance authorities before
issuing preferred provider plans. 24 1
1987) (differences in benefit levels for health care services obtained from preferred and nonpre-
ferred providers); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-22-617(3) (1986) (identity, location and specialty
of contract providers, description of insured benefits, including deductibles, coinsurance or
copayments, and description of quality assurance program and grievance procedures); Wis.
ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 3.48(5) (1986) (services covered, definition of emergency services, loca-
tion of providers for covered services, cost of plan, enrollment procedures, limits on benefits,
and limits on choice of providers); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483,
1487 (to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-24(2)) (applies to health benefit plans issued,
delivered, or renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989) (differences in benefit levels for services obtained
from preferred and nonpreferred providers).
237. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.1 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
§§ 2240.3(e), (f) (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2675(2)(A) (Supp. 1987); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58.260.6(c)(3) (Pam. Supp. 1987).
238. Kan. Ins. Bull. 1985-16 (June 24, 1985) (insurer shall file with Commissioner of Insur-
ance: copy of contract between insurer and health care providers; if PPO involved, copy of
contract between PPO and health care providers; list of health care services covered by alter-
nate rates of payment; and if PPO involved, statement certifying PPO capable of providing
covered services); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2675(1) (Supp. 1987) (insurer shall file
registration statement with Insurance Commissioner containing: name which PPA intends to
use and its business address; name, address, and nature of any separate organization which
administers PPA for insurers; and names and addresses of all preferred providers and terms of
preferred provider agreement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20, subd. 15(4) (Supp. 1988) (same);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58.260.6(c) (Pam. Supp. 1987) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 764a(f)
(Purdon Pam. Supp. 1988) (preferred provider organization that assumes financial risk must
provide requested information to Secretary of Health and Insurance Commissioner prior to
commencing operation). Certain registration requirements contained in PPA statutes and reg-
ulations apply only to third-party administrators. See ILL. ANN. STAT. § 982k (Smith-Hurd
Pam. Supp. 1988); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 50, §§ 6501.10-.100 (1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24-A, § 2674 (Supp. 1987).
239. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2679 (Supp. 1987) (administrator or insurer who
issues or administers plan incorporating utilization review must file annual report with Super-
intendent of Insurance documenting: number and types of evaluations performed; result of
each evaluation; number and result of any provider or patient appeals; complaints filed that
state cause of action against administrator of insurer based on damages incurred as result of
prospective evaluations); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.56 (West Supp. 1988) (organization
shall file report documenting number of persons receiving health benefits; number of group and
individual contracts providing health care services; and dollar volume of business conducted
under prudent purchase agreements); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.20, subd. 15(4) (Supp. 1988)
(annual report shall contain summary data relating to financial reimbursement offered to pre-
ferred providers); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-260.6(c) (Pam. Supp. 1987) (same).
240. See NAIC Model Act § 5(A)(2) (National Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 1987).
241. See id. § 4(C) (entity that enters into contract with health care provider, but not en-
gaged in activities that require it to obtain license as health care insurer, must file with Com-
missioner of Insurance information describing its activities and terms of provider contract;
employers that contract for exclusive benefit of employees exempt from registration require-
ments); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1487 (to be codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-30-23(d)) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or renewed on or
after Jan. 1, 1989) (same).
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V. EVALUATION OF THE TEXAS PREFERRED PROVIDER PLAN RULES
The current trend toward facilitating PPA development through legisla-
tive and administrative action 242 indicates a national recognition of the va-
lidity of preferred provider arrangements as a procompetitive mechanism for
financing and delivering high quality, cost-effective health care services.243
By regulating the formation and operation of insurer-sponsored preferred
provider arrangements and the issuance of preferred provider health benefit
plans, the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules represent an attempt to rec-
oncile the competing state health care policy objectives of cost containment
and quality assurance. 244 Accordingly, while the rules give commercial in-
surers the green light to contain costs by engaging in provider contracting
and monitoring the utilization of health care resources, certain provisions in
the rules designed to enhance the quality of health care services delivered
pursuant to preferred provider arrangements require insurers to proceed
with appropriate caution. Certain other provisions in the rules that fail to
promote qualities of care adequately or that unduly impair cost containment
under the preferred provider health care finance and delivery system, how-
ever, warrant critical analysis.
A. Red Light to Regulation of PPAs Sponsored by Noninsurer Entities
State regulation of the structure and operation of preferred provider
health benefit plans under the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules focuses
exclusively on health care finance and delivery systems implemented by
commercial insurers.245 Despite the narrow scope of the rules, however, a
242. For a list of state laws and regulations enacted to facilitate the development of pre-
ferred provider arrangements, see supra note 102.
243. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.6 (West Supp. 1988) (legislature intends to ensure citi-
zens receive high quality health care coverage in most efficient, cost effective manner possible
by permitting formation of professional and institutional provider groups and purchasing
groups as efficient-sized contracting units and negotiation for alternate rates of pay); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:2201 (West Supp. 1988) (legislature acknowledges that health care costs
must be contained without jeopardizing quality, that health care purchasers and providers
require some incentive to strive for most cost-effective methods of delivering quality patient
care, and that state can assist in reducing health care costs by authorizing the formation of
preferred provider organizations); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4108 (1984) (in connection with
PPA provisions, legislature finds that it should promote competition for health care services
while preserving quality of care); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:1 (Supp. 1987) (purpose of
PPA legislation is to ensure that contracts between insurers and preferred providers are fair
and in the public interest and to establish reasonable regulations to contain health care costs
while preserving quality of care); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 558.260.5 editor's note (Supp. 1987)
(purpose of PPA legislation is to enable insurers and persons coordinating provision of health
care benefits on fee for service basis to seek, experiment with, and implement innovative means
of reducing costs of health care services); see NAIC Model Act § 2 (National Ass'n Ins.
Comm'rs 1987) (purpose of legislation is to encourage health care cost containment while
preserving quality of care); see also Act effective July 1, 1988, 1988 Ga. Laws 1483, 1484 (to be
codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 30-30-21) (applies to health benefit plans issued, delivered, or
renewed on or after Jan. 1, 1989) (legislature intends to encourage health care cost contain-
ment while preserving quality of care by permitting insurers to form PPAs and by preserving
minimum standards to PPAs and preferred provider health benefit plans).
244. See TEXAS SENATE COMM. ON INS., INTERIM REPORT ON PREFERRED PROVIDER
PLANS, 70th Leg. 1, 3-4 (1986) [hereinafter INSURANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
245. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3701 (1986).
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variety of entities in Texas currently engage in provider contracting. 246
Under the present regulations' framework, insured, self-insured, and nonin-
sured preferred provider arrangements operate without specific guidelines
for providers' panel assembly, health care benefits, and service delivery.
The State Board of Insurance has statutory jurisdiction to adopt rules gov-
erning the health benefit plans offered by commercial insurers, 2 4 7 group hos-
pital service corporations, 248 and HMOs. 249 As presently drafted, however,
the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules only contain guidelines for plans
issued by commercial insurance companies. 250 The Texas Insurance Code
permits group hospital service corporations to contract with institutional
and professional health care providers, other than physicians. 251 As a pre-
requisite to provider contracting under the code, the corporation must ob-
tain approval of form provider agreements from the Commissioner of
Insurance. 25 2 In a recent order the Commissioner approved a form agree-
ment submitted by a corporation for use in contracting with physician prov-
iders. 253 By permitting group hospital service corporations on a case by case
basis to contract with the same range of providers covered by the Texas
Preferred Provider Plan Rules, the Commissioner is effectively permitting
the corporations to circumvent provider participation and service delivery
requirements imposed on commercial insurers. To eliminate this regulatory
dichotomy, the State Board of Insurance should amend the rules to apply
specifically to group hospital service corporations. The Board may also con-
sider expanding the scope of the rules to permit an HMO to assemble pre-
ferred provider panels consisting of HMO panel members 254 or advocating
selective contracting by public entities.255
Self-insured and certain other noninsured preferred provider arrange-
ments remain outside the statutory jurisdiction of the State Board of Insur-
ance and therefore outside the scope of the rules as presently drafted or
amended. ERISA regulations impose reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
obligations on employers that administer qualified employee welfare benefit
plans. 256 The preemption of state law by ERISA in the context of employee
welfare benefit plans that include purchaser-based preferred provider ar-
246. INSURANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 244, at 7-8; TMA TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 5.
247. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.42 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1988).
248. Id. art. 20.02.
249. Id. art. 20A.04.
250. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3701 (1986).
251. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 20.11 (Vernon 1981).
252. Id. art. 20.02(e).
253. Order No. 87-0176, Approving Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas Proposed Pro-
vider Agreement Form (Feb. 23, 1987).
254. W. Darling, Comments of Wood, Lucksinger & Epstein on Texas Proposed Preferred
Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3705 (1986) 1-2 (Jan. 6, 1986) [here-
inafter WLE Comments].
255. For an analysis of state-sponsored selective contracting, see supra notes 96-100 and
accompanying text.
256. See ERISA § 3(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982) (employee welfare benefit plan includes
any program that provides medical, surgical, or hospital care, or benefits in the event of sick-
ness, accident, disability, death, or unemployment).
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rangements depends on the manner in which self-insured employers elect to
finance and administer purchaser-based PPAs.257 Regulatory grey areas
arise when employees contract with insurance companies to administer the
plan and process claims 258 and when employers purchase "stop loss" cover-
age from insurance companies.259 Because these arrangements combine as-
pects of self-funding and indemnity insurance, the ERISA state law
preemption may not apply. Indeed, two recent federal cases indicated that
"mixed plans" may be subject to state insurance regulation. 260 Noninsured
preferred provider arrangements not presently regulated by ERISA guide-
lines or the State Board of Insurance include PPAs sponsored by providers
and third-party entities. Because the Board has no legal authority to control
the activities of PPA sponsors not engaged in the business of insurance, how-
ever, noninsured PPAs may continue to function independently. 261
B. Red Light to Selective Provider Contracting
The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules mandate that insurers form
open panel preferred provider arrangements. 262 The permissible terms and
conditions of provider participation under the Texas rules, however, prevent
insurers from engaging in selective contracting as a method of cost contain-
ment and quality control. Provider participation requirements also prevent
insurers from establishing specialty or limited service provider panels.
The provisions regulating panel assembly contained in the Texas Preferred
Provider Plan Rules require insurers to extend panel membership to any
professional or institutional provider willing to meet the terms and condi-
tions of provider participation. 263 The rules' provider participation provi-
sions appropriately guarantee individual providers the right to participate in
a preferred provider panel 264 and prevent discrimination among various pro-
vider classes. 265 The "any willing provider" requirement 266 may, however,
substantially inhibit the insurer's ability to evaluate the professional qualifi-
cations of prospective panel members and realize maximum cost savings.
Under the rules as presently drafted, general quality considerations consti-
tute a valid condition of preferred provider participation. 267 The nonselec-
tive approach to provider contracting advocated by the rules, however, may
prevent insurers from conducting a comprehensive quality appraisal of pro-
257. See id. § 1144(a); Kilberg & Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee
Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313 (1984).
258. See FTC STUDY, supra note 102, at 14-16; Grant supra note 56, at 41.
259. See FTC STUDY, supra note 102, at 14-15.
260. See Michigan United Food v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 801 (1986) (self-funded employee benefit plan that purchased stop-loss coverage
subject to mandated benefits provisions of Massachusetts insurance law).
261. INSURANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 244, at 8.
262. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1), (2) (1986); see FTC STUDY, supra note 102, at 42.
263. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986).
264. See supra notes 129-38.
265. See supra note 177.
266. See FTC STUDY, supra note 102, at 42-44 (analyzes incidence, rationale, and impact
on PPAs of any willing provider provisions.
267. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(1) (1986).
1988] 1187
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
spective preferred providers. In comments submitted to the State Board of
Insurance during the preferred provider plan rulemaking process, insurance
industry spokespersons emphasized the important role of quality screening
in the formation of preferred provider panels.268 One commentator associ-
ated with the provider community proposed that the rules set forth a nonex-
clusive list of objective factors for evaluating potential provider
participants. 269 According to the commentator, possible objective factors
relating to provider quality include the number of complaints submitted to
state licensing agencies concerning provider performance, the number of ad-
ministrative or private sanctions imposed on a provider, and the number of
civil suits against a provider successfully alleging professional or institu-
tional liability.270
Comments submitted to the State Board of Insurance by representatives of
the insurance industry in connection with the Texas Preferred Provider Plan
Rules' rulemaking process indicate that the any willing provider require-
ment also creates a threefold negative impact on PPA cost containment ini-
tiatives. 27 1 First, the any willing provider requirement removes the
competitive incentive for providers to grant discounts.272 Selective provider
contracting creates an incentive on the part of providers seeking to obtain
panel membership to offer discounts in consideration for receiving preferred
provider status.27 3 Under the nonselective system contemplated by the
rules, however, insurers automatically guarantee preferred status to provid-
ers that agree to comply with the terms and conditions of panel participa-
tion. As a result, providers need not offer competitive discounts in
bargaining for panel membership.
Second, even if the any willing provider requirement does not inhibit pro-
vider discounts, certain comments predicted that the rules' failure to author-
ize selective provider contracting will promote the development of discount-
268. See D. Erenerman, Comments of Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. on Texas Proposed
Preferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3705 (1986) 2 (Jan. 16,
1986) [hereinafter Union Mutual Comments]; J. Cross, Comments of John Hancock Life Ins.
Co. on Texas Proposed Preferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-
.3705 (1986) 4 (Jan. 17, 1986) [hereinafter John Hancock Comments]; A. Simpson, Comments
of Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. on Texas Proposed Preferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3705 (1986) 1 (Jan. 8, 1986).
269. WLE Comments, supra note 254, at 3 (objective factors proposed for institutional
providers only).
270. See id; John Hancock Comments, supra note 268, at 4. But see T. Campbell, Com-
ments of Aetna Life Ins. Co. on Texas Proposed Preferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-.3705 (1986) 2 (Jan. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Aetna Comments] (discusses
difficulty of applying specific quality criteria to prospective preferred providers).
271. See Aetna Comments, supra note 270, at 2; Letter from Timothy R. Campbell, Asst.
Vice Pres., Aetna Life Ins. Co. to Woody Pogue, Deputy Ins. Comm'r 2 (Jan. 7, 1986) [herein-
after Aetna Letter].
272. Aetna Letter, supra note 271, at 2.
273. Id.; S. Bleikoff, Comments of American General Group Ins. Co. on Texas Proposed
Preferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3703 (1986) 1 (Jan. 10,
1986) [hereinafter American General Comments]. For a discussion of provider discounts as a
form of consideration for increases in patient volume, associated with participation in pre-
ferred provider arrangements, see supra note 23.
1188 [Vol. 41
COMMENTS
only PPAs. 274 Selective provider contracting enables PPA sponsors to as-
semble panels consisting of cost-efficient professionals and institutions.275
The preferred provider health care delivery system operates to contain costs
by enabling these proven low cost providers, practicing pursuant to the PPA
utilization management protocol, to deliver a significant proportion of the
covered health care services.276 Analysts regard preferred provider arrange-
ments that rely on provider discounts as the exclusive method of cost con-
tainment as economically unstable and conducive to cost shifting. 277
Finally, the any willing provider requirement effectively eliminates pre-
ferred provider plan competition. 278 Several bases for competition exist
among preferred provider health benefit plans. In addition to premium rates
and benefit levels, the composition of the preferred provider panel has been
identified as the most significant procompetitive plan variable. 279 The com-
mentator noted that the types of providers represented on the panel and the
reputation of particular panel members constitute extremely valuable
sources of insurance product differentiation. 280 Representatives of the pro-
vider community generally regard competition among providers on the basis
of fees, quality of service, skill, experience, and access as a positive charac-
teristic of the market for health care services.28 1 The nonselective provider
contracting process advocated by the Texas rules, however, prevents insurers
from utilizing this market characteristic to design a competitive preferred
provider health benefit plan that features a cost-efficient, skilled and accessi-
ble provider panel. To enable insurers to adequately assess the professional
qualifications of potential preferred providers and to eliminate the potential
adverse effect of nonselective provider contracting on cost containment
under the preferred provider health care finance and delivery system, the
State Board of Insurance should amend the Texas Preferred Provider Plan
Rules to permit insurers to contract with prospective providers on a selective
basis.
By preventing insurers from engaging in selective provider contracting,
the Texas rules' any willing provider requirement necessarily prohibits the
formation of specialty or limited service provider panels. In comments on
the proposed preferred provider plan rules, a proponent of single class pro-
vider panels convincingly argued that open panel plans force insurers to in-
cur higher costs. 282 For example, a requirement that insurers providing
274. See Aetna Comments, supra note 270, at 2.
275. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
276. See Hester & Wouters, supra note 18.
277. See INSURANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 244, at 4; TMA TASK FORCE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 4; Gabel & Ermann, supra note 18, at 307; Aetna Comments, supra note
270, at 2.
278. Aetna Letter, supra note 271, at 2.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 6.11 (1986) [hereinafter AMA JUDICIAL OPINIONS]; see id. § 9.06 (free
competition among physicians and alternative systems of care constitute prerequisites to opti-
mal patient care).
282. Aetna Comments, supra note 270, at 2.
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coverage for inpatient hospital care extend preferred provider status to
nonhospital practitioners forces the insurer to establish two separate systems
for application review, contract negotiation, billing and claims, and perform-
ance evaluation. 28 3 Preferred provider plan rules in certain other states pro-
vide a more flexible framework for panel composition by permitting insurers
to limit panel membership based on types of services,284 provider spe-
cialty,28 5 and the anticipated needs of the insured population. 28 6 To enable
insurers to tailor health benefit plans to the needs of the insured population
and to enhance cost savings by facilitating competition on the basis of panel
composition, the State Board of Insurance should amend the Texas Pre-
ferred Provider Plan Rules to permit insurers to make use of selective pro-
vider contracting to offer preferred provider health benefit plans that feature
specialty or limited service provider panels.
C. Differential Benefit Limit Requires Insurers to Proceed with Caution
An insurer's ability to promote the use of preferred providers by offering
insureds an incentive to obtain health care services from contract providers
constitutes an important component of the PPA cost containment equa-
tion.28 7 Certain provisions of the Texas Insurance Code, however, prohibit
insurers from drafting policy provisions that discriminate among insureds on
non-risk grounds or that directly or indirectly dictate the insureds' choice of
health care provider. 288 Furthermore, representatives of the provider com-
munity view freedom of provider choice as a fundamental prerequisite to the
delivery of optimal patient care. 289 To accommodate the interests of insur-
ers, insureds, and providers, the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules au-
thorize insurers to issue health benefit plans featuring nondiscriminatory,
potentially cost saving differential benefit levels that preserve the insureds'
autonomy in provider selection. 290 Specifically, the rules permit insurers to
institute a health care finance system that reimburses insureds who obtain
services from preferred providers at a rate thirty percent higher than the
basic level of coverage. 291 Consistent with provider community recommen-
283. Id.
284. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 609.01(4) (West Supp. 1987).
285. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-4110 (1984).
286. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.1 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2672
(Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 550.53(1), (9) (West Supp. 1988); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-4110 (1984).
287. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
289. See AMA JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 281, at § 9.06 (every individual has right to
select his physician); see also TMA Comments, supra note 5, at 4-7, 8-11. TMA contended
that because preferred provider insurance plans require insureds to obtain services from a par-
ticular provider in order to receive a higher level of coverage, the plans violated the freedom of
choice provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. Id. at 5. TMA disputed insurance industry
arguments that an insured's provider and benefit schedule selection represented an exercise of
voluntary choice. Id. at 6-8. Specifically, TMA maintained that preferred provider plans con-
stituted an intrinsically coercive form of health care reimbursement system. Id. at 8.




dations, the State Board of Insurance appropriately reinforced the rules'
moderate differential benefit scheme by banning the issuance of exclusive
provider health benefit plans.292
Analysts assert that a twenty percent marginal increase in benefits offered
for services obtained from preferred providers constitutes an adequate posi-
tive incentive for insureds to elect to obtain health care services from pre-
ferred rather than nonpreferred providers.293 The thirty percent benefit
differential authorized by the rules, therefore, is large enough to encourage
the use of preferred providers, but not so large as to require insureds to
obtain services from a particular provider.294 Moreover, the rules' prohibi-
tion on health benefit plans based on exclusive provider arrangements fur-
ther protects the insured's ability to select freely a health care provider by
guaranteeing a basic level of coverage for services obtained from nonpre-
ferred providers. 295 The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules, therefore,
successfully resolve the conflict between the Insurance Code policy against
imposing restrictions on freedom of provider choice and the economic policy
in favor of containing health care costs by preserving the insured's autonomy
in provider choice without nullifying the effect of differential benefit levels as
a mechanism for patient channelling.
D. Access and .Referral Provisions Require Insurers
to Proceed with Caution
The provider access and referral regulations set forth in the Texas Pre-
ferred Provider Plan Rules distinctively impact four variables in the health
care service delivery component of the PPA cost containment equation.
First, the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules expressly guarantee insureds
direct and reasonable access to all classes of professional providers licensed
to deliver covered services. 296 Access guarantees impliedly dictate the
number, type, and availability of health care providers under contract with
an insurer, the first variable in the PPA cost containment equation. Provi-
sions protecting an insured's right to access health care providers, therefore,
compromise the insurer's ability to exercise complete discretion in provider
panel assembly. 297 Moreover, adequate access requirements compel insurers
to institute PPA operation procedures that guarantee the availability of ap-
propriate health care personnel and facilities.
Based on the specific characteristics, medical needs, and projected demand
for health care services of the insured population, adequate access consti-
tutes a fundamental prerequisite to quality health care service delivery under
a preferred provider arrangement. To deliver the guarantee of adequate ac-
cess to preferred provider health care services, the State Board of Insurance
292. Id. § 3.3703(2); see TMA Safeguard Memo, supra note 5, at 3.
293. See FTC STUDY, supra note 102, at 48.
294. See Aetna Letter, supra note 271, at 2.
295. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(2) (1986).
296. Id. § 3.3705(1).




should amend the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules to require insurers to
satisfy specific access standards similar to those adopted by other states. 298
Specifically, the Board should amend the rules to require insurers to form
preferred provider panels that consist of the number of professional and in-
stitutional providers, including administrative and support personnel, neces-
sary to enable the PPA to satisfy a minimum insured to provider ratio. 299
The Board should further amend the rules to require insurers to provide
insureds adequate access to specialty care through contracting or referral
and to contract with institutional providers located within a reasonable geo-
graphic proximity to insureds. 3 ° °
Second, the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules prevent an insurer from
requiring that a certain class of practitioner refer a patient into the preferred
provider system.30 1 Accordingly, the rules impact a second variable in the
PPA cost containment equation by regulating initial preferred provider re-
ferral. 30 2 Specifically, the rules prevent insurers from designating a primary
care physician to act as a health care resource gatekeeper. 30 3 Primary care
gatekeepers function within health care delivery systems to promote the effi-
cient use of medical resources by coordinating the care rendered by partici-
pating providers. 3° 4 In comments on the proposed rules, representatives of
the provider community characterized the primary care gatekeeper as an
access limitation mechanism that prevents insureds from obtaining treat-
ment from the practitioner or specialist of his choice.30 5 The complete ban
on gatekeeper mechanisms imposed by the Texas Preferred Provider Plan
Rules, however, denies insurers an important cost-saving tool and evidences
a disregard for variations in the design of certain gatekeeping mechanisms.
Preferred provider plans need not necessarily make gatekeeper referral an
absolute prerequisite for access to the preferred provider system. To achieve
the cost savings associated with coordinated utilization without violating
policy concerns relating to restricted access to health care services, preferred
provider plans could treat gatekeeper referral as an optional route for entry
into the preferred provider system. 30 6 Under this alternate framework, pre-
ferred provider plans could offer a higher level of coverage or financial incen-
tives to insureds who elect to access the system by seeking an initial referral
from a preferred provider trained to make appropriate referral
determinations. 307
By providing insureds continuity of care and ease of access to providers
298. See supra note 204.
299. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 2240.2(b) (1984).
300. See id. § 2240.2(3); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 3.48(2) (1986).
301. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(3) (1986).
302. For a discussion of provider referral in the context of PPA open panel health care
delivery system, see supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
303. WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra note 104, at 4.
304. See Trapnell, Actuarial Problems in PPOs, in NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET, supra
note 15, at 285, 293 (outlines gatekeeper utilization control device).
305. See TMA Safeguard Memo, supra note 5, at 2.




while managing the delivery of necessary health care services, preferred pro-
vider plans that employ primary care gatekeepers promote both quality of
care and cost containment. In recognition of the valuable function of gate-
keepers, the State Board of Insurance should amend the Texas Preferred
Provider Plan Rules to permit insurer-sponsored PPAs to utilize primary
care gatekeepers and offer insureds an incentive to use the primary care gate-
keeper whether the gatekeeper refers the insured to a preferred or nonpre-
ferred provider.
Third, consistent with provider community recommendations,30 8 the
Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules guarantee each insured the right to the
treatment and testing procedures prescribed by the insured's practitioner.3 9
By regulating intra and extra system referral, a third variable in the PPA
cost containment equation, 3 10 the rules appropriately assure flexible referral
among preferred and nonpreferred providers. 311 Moreover, the pre-referral
disclosure requirements imposed by the rules3 12 comply with the referral
procedures advocated by the provider community in the context of alterna-
tive health care delivery systems.313 Open referral permits providers to di-
rect insureds to the most appropriate medical care without regard to the
providers' contractual relationship with the insurer.3 14 Accordingly, the
open referral system mandated by the rules promotes quality in health care
service delivery by allowing the provider to function as an advocate for the
health care needs of each insured patient.
Finally, specific provisions contained in the Texas Preferred Provider Plan
Rules address the delivery of emergency care services, a fourth variable in
the PPA cost containment equation. At the expense of payor cost contain-
ment, the rules specifically require insurers to reimburse insureds for emer-
gency care services rendered by nonpreferred providers at the preferred rate
until the insured can be safely transferred to the care of a preferred pro-
vider.3 15 By facilitating the prompt delivery of emergency care services and
eliminating financial incentives to transfer patients insured under preferred
provider plans, the rules' emergency care provisions effectively promote
quality in health care service delivery. 316
308. See MINORITY REPORT, supra note 5, at 9.
309. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(1) (1986).
310. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
31 1. See AMA JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 281, § 3.04 (physician may refer patient for
diagnosis or treatment to another physician, specialist, or health care provider if referral will
benefit patient).
312. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(1) (1986); see supra text accompanying note 200.
313. See AMA JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 281, § 8.12 (if PPO or HMO limits referral
to medical specialists or diagnostic or treatment facilities, when physician determines patient
requires specialty care, the physician must inform patient of need for and consequences of
referral).
314. TMA Safeguard Memo, supra note 5, at 2.
315. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(1) (1986).
316. See G. Hooser, Comments of the American College of Emergency Physicians, Texas
Chapter on Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3705
(1986) 1 (June 3, 1986).
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E. Green Light to Prospective Utilization Review
Utilization review procedures implemented in connection with the pre-
ferred provider health care delivery system attempt to contain health care
costs by monitoring the quantity of services delivered. 31 7 The Texas Pre-
ferred Provider Plan Rules authorize PPA sponsors to conduct both pro-
spective and retrospective utilization review.318  Certain prospective
utilization review procedures require the physician to obtain pretreatment
authorization for payment from the third-party health care payor.3 t 9 To the
extent that it subjects professional medical judgment to a cost-benefit analy-
sis, prospective utilization review provides the setting for a direct confronta-
tion between medical and economic decision making.320 In practice,
economic considerations may override professional judgment and the result-
ing payment denial may operate to preclude the delivery of needed patient
care. By enabling insurers to require participating physicians to obtain pre-
treatment authorization for services delivered under a preferred provider
health benefit plan, prospective utilization review conducted under the pres-
ent Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules may compromise the quality of
care delivered pursuant to preferred provider arrangements. Moreover, pro-
spective utilization review may expose insurers to liability for negligence in
the design and implementation of prospective utilization review procedures,
if care is denied as a result of a utilization review decision that overrides the
medical judgment of the treating physician. Prospective utilization review
may also expose insureds to contract and extracontract liability for bad faith.
Finally, a system of prospective utilization review that directly incorporates
financial considerations may expose providers to liability, if financial consid-
erations cause providers to reduce the level of services delivered to insureds
pursuant to a preferred provider health benefit plan below community
standards.
A recent California state court decision indicates that an insurer may be
legally responsible for harm resulting from the improper design and applica-
tion of a prospective utilization review program. In Wickline v. State of Cal-
ifornia 321 a California court of appeals ruled that a patient who is harmed as
317. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
318. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3702, 3.3705(4) (1986).
319. See supra notes 46-49.
320. In its amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the respondent to the California
Court of Appeals in Wickline v. California, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986),
counsel for the California Hospital Association noted that "hospitals and patients are caught
in the crossfire of a major social conflict centered on reconciling the competing forces for
health care cost containment and health care quality." Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the
California Hospital Association in Support of Respondent Lois J. Wickline at 7, Wickline v.
California, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986) (2D Civ. B010156). Counsel
characterized each decision regarding the utilization of inpatient care as a skirmish in the
overall conflict. Id. For an analysis of the confrontation between medical and economic deci-
sion making in the PPA context, see Anthony, supra note 39, at 87-92; Entin, DRGs, HMOs
and PPOs: Introducing Economic Issues in the Medical Malpractice Case, 20 FORUM 674, 681-
84 (1985); Wilcox, Pressure to Serve Two Masters, TEX. MED., June 1986, at 67, 67-69.
321. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986). Wickline brought suit against the
State of California as the administrator of the Medi-Cal utilization review program for dam-
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a result of the denial of medical treatment may recover from all those re-
sponsible for the failure to treat, including, when appropriate, the third-
party payor of health care services.3 22 According to the court, the appropri-
ate circumstances for holding a third-party payor liable exist when utiliza-
tion review measures designed to contain health care costs unreasonably
override a treating physician's medical judgment.3 23
In Wickline the appellate court identified the principal issue in the case to
revolve around who bears the responsibility for a patient's hospital dis-
charge, the patient's physician or Medi-Cal, the health care payor.324 The
Wickline court found that the decision to discharge is the responsibility of
the patient's treating physician who is in a better position than a member of
a utilization review panel to determine the medically necessary length of
stay. 325 The court further found that physicians should appeal a denial of
ages associated with the amputation of her right leg. Wickline v. California, No. NWC 60672
(Cal. Civ. 1982) (no written opinion issued); see Butler, Preferred Provider Organization Liabil-
ity for Physician Malpractice, 11 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 364 n.154 (1986). The trial court
found that the patient was injured as a result of a premature discharge ordered pursuant to
continued stay review. See Butler, supra, at 364. Accordingly, the trial court held that the
Medi-Cal patient presented a valid cause of action against the state utilization review consult-
ant for denial of a request for an extension of hospital stay and awarded Wickline $500,000.00
in damages. Id. On appeal, the second district court of appeals reversed the trial court and
held in favor of the State. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr 661 (1986). The Supreme
Court of California dismissed the petition for review and remanded the case to the second
district court of appeals. 43 Cal. 3d 1035, 741 P.2d 613, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987). Citations
refer to the republished opinion of the second district court of appeals. 192 Cal. App. 3d at
1647, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
322. 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1644, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819. The facts in Wickline parallel the typical scenario
for a utilization monitored inpatient hospital stay. On January 6, 1977, after obtaining pre-
treatment authorization from a Medi-Cal Consultant for surgery and hospitalization, Wickline
was admitted to Van Nuys Community Hospital (the Hospital). See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
22, § 51327(a)(2) (1977) (to obtain Medi-Cal coverage for nonemergency hospital care, a
Medi-Cal Consultant shall authorize specified number of days for hospitalization prior to ad-
mission); see also CAL. WELF. INST. CODE § 14132 (West 1977) (prior authorization by Medi-
Cal Consultant shall be based on determination of medical necessity). The next day Wickline
underwent a lumbar sympathectomy. Due to complications, the patient's surgeon determined
that Wickline's condition required hospitalization beyond the ten days allocated by Medi-Cal.
Accordingly, he submitted a formal request for an extension of stay to the Medi-Cal on-site
nurse. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 51327(a)(2) (1977) (necessary hospitalization beyond
specified number of days shall be covered only upon approval of extension of hospital stay by
Medi-Cal Consultant on or before last day of approved hospitalization period). Refusing to
grant the requested extension of hospital stay, the on-site nurse referred Wickline's case to the
Medi-Cal consulting physician for a final determination. Id. Based on a telephone conference
with the on-site nurse, the Medi-Cal Consultant granted a four-day extension in lieu of the
eight-day extension requested by Wickline's surgeon. In granting the four-day extension, the
Medi-Cal Consultant elected not to review written information concerning Wickline's condi-
tion supplied by her surgeon. On January 21, 1977, in compliance with the limited extension
of stay, Wickline's treating physicians processed her discharge from the Hospital. Subsequent
to her discharge, the patient experienced increased pain and loss of circulation in her leg. On
January 30, 1977, Wickline was readmitted to the Hospital as an emergency patient. Two
weeks later, due to severe clotting and infection, Wickline's surgeon amputated her leg above
the knee. Wickline elected not to sue her attending physician, since she regarded the physician
as much a victim of the system as the patient. Butler, supra note 321, at 364 (citing S. TIBBITS
& A. MANZANO, PPOs: AN EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE 142 (1984)).
325. 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
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extended hospital stay issued in connection with prospective utilization re-
view if, in the physicians' professional judgment, a patient's condition war-
rants continued hospitalization. 326 Applying this rule to the Wickline facts,
the court conceded that since Medi-Cal financed the patient's treatment, its
input as to the extent of hospital care delivered may have influenced the
treating physician's course of action. 327 Upon determining that Medi-Cal's
influence in denying payment authorization for continued hospital stay was
insufficient to override the professional judgment of Wickline's treating phy-
sician, 328 however, the court held that Medi-Cal was not liable for damages
resulting from Wickline's premature discharge because Medi-Cal was not a
party to her treating physician's medical discharge decision.329
The Wickline decision sets a significant precedent for insurer liability in
the operation of utilization review pursuant to the Texas Preferred Provider
Plan Rules. Notably, Wickline represents the first appellate court opinion to
address the liability of a third-party payor for damages resulting from its
prospective review of a medical decision.330 Moreover, while the Wickline
decision focuses on the liability of the State of California as sponsor of the
Medi-Cal program, the holding should not be read as limited to its facts.
Indeed, the opinion specifically recognizes that both public and private
health care payors employ prospective utilization review as a method of cost
containment. 33' As the Wickline court predicted, the decision to link health
payors to the medical malpractice chain of causation by imposing liability
for their participation in utilization review activities raises issues of great
significance to the health care community and the insured public. 332 In par-
ticular, the Wickline decision provides useful guidance for third-party
payors concerning the proper design and operation of utilization manage-
ment programs.
Pursuant to the Wickline standard, certain provisions contained in the
Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules governing utilization review may fail to
facilitate the delivery of quality care adequately and, as a result, may expose
326. Id.; see CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 51000(g)(1)-(3) (1977). Under the Medi-Cal
regulations, a provider must initiate an appeal of an extension of stay denial within thirty days
of notification of the decision. Id. § 51003(g)(l). If the Medi-Cal Consultant finds no grounds
for altering its decision, the consultant is directed to forward the appeal to the Field Services
Regional Office and thereafter to the California Department of Health. Id. §§ 51003(g)(2), (3).
327. 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1646, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
328. Id.
329. Id.; 239 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20.
330. Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the California Medical Association in Support of
Respondent Lois J. Wickline at 3, Wickline v. California, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1986) (No. 2D Civ. 010156). Counsel for the California Medical Association
stated:
The Wickline case has been noted in medical and legal publications throughout
the country as an example of the concerns raised by prospective review pro-
grams. Moreover, this court's opinion may well be the first appellate court case
in the nation to discuss the legal issues raised by the health care rationing
process.
Id.; see also L. Snyder, Remarks at the AMCRA Annual Conference (Sept. 26, 1986) (discuss-
ing significance of Wickline case for potential PPA liability).
331. 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1633, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
332. Id.
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insurers to liability. The Texas rules appropriately guarantee the insured
patient's right to the treatment and diagnostic techniques prescribed by the
insured's professional provider. 333 The Texas rules, however, also permit
insurers to implement procedures for evaluating and correcting health care
resource expenditures. 334 In an effort to ensure that resource utilization pro-
cedures do not compromise a provider's ability to exercise professional judg-
ment in the decision of patient care, the rules authorize insurers to institute
delegated, physician-controlled utilization review. 335 In a departure from
the utilization review procedures advocated by Wickline, however, the Texas
Preferred Provider Plan Rules fail to incorporate an appeal mechanism for
providers who obtain utilization review determinations that conflict with a
prescribed treatment program. To limit potential insurer liability in the op-
eration of PPA utilization review mechanisms, therefore, the State Board of
Insurance should amend the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules to require
insurers to institute procedures for appealing treatment denials in connection
with prospective utilization review.
In addition to liability for usurping professional treatment decisions, pro-
spective utilization review mechanisms may constitute a source of insurer
333. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3705(1) (1986). For a discussion of this patient safeguard
in this context of provider referral, see supra notes 308-314 and accompanying text. TMA first
recommended the provision as one of its counterproposals to PPO legislation sponsored by the
insurance industry. See TMA Safeguard Memo, supra note 5, at 3. The provision is designed
to prevent undue interference with a physician's discretion to treat his patient. Id. TMA
proposed further language that would expressly prohibit interference by the insurer in patient
care and preserve the traditional physician-patient relationship under the PPA system. Id.
The TMA version read: "Each insured patient shall have the right to the treatment and diag-
nostic techniques as prescribed by the physician of the patient's choice without interference by
the insurer. The insurer shall support continuity of care, and the development of a continuing
relationship between physician and patient." Id.; see also CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
§ 2240. l(a)(2) (1984) (insurers required to ensure decisions relating to health care services to
be rendered to insureds based on the insureds' medical needs and made by or under supervi-
sion of licensed physicians or other health care professionals); id. § 2240.4 (contracts between
exclusive providers and insurers shall provide that providers' primary consideration shall be
quality of health care services rendered to insureds); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2203 (West
Supp. 1988) (agreement between group purchaser and provider to form preferred provider
organization shall not authorize group purchaser to direct or control provision or selection of
forms or types of medical services to group members); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 628.37 (West Supp.
1987) (no insurance plan related to or providing health care may alter direct relationship and
responsibility of professional persons to their patients for the professional services rendered).
But see Fox & Anderson, Hybrid HMOs, PPOs: The New Focus, Bus. & HEALTH, Mar. 1986,
at 20, 21 (discussing merits of provider at risk PPA utilization schemes).
334. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3702 (1986).
335. Id. § 3.3705(4); see TMA Comments, supra note 5, at 25. In a statement before the
State Board of Insurance, D. Clifford Burross, M.D., TMA President, argued against insurer-
controlled utilization review. D. Burross, Statement Before the State Board of Insurance on
Preferred Provider Plan Proposed Regulations 1 (Jan. 17, 1986) [hereinafter TMA President
Statement]. Dr. Burross asserted that physicians traditionally base medical treatment deci-
sions on personal knowledge of the patient's condition and the patient's informed consent. Id.
Accordingly, Dr. Burross objected to provisions contained in the proposed preferred provider
plan rules that permitted nonphysician insurer employees to effectively veto the treating physi-
cian's medical judgment by denying reimbursement for prescribed care. Id., see Wilcox, supra
note 320, at 67 (proposed preferred provider plan rules' insurer veto power added to benefit-




contract and extra-contract liability. 336 Based on an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that parties to an insurance contract are bound by
duty to uphold, 337 certain recent state court decisions have addressed an
insurer's potential liability for bad faith in denying reimbursement for cer-
tain medical treatment.338 Possible sources of liability for bad faith in the
health insurance context include intentional denial or failure to process and
pay a claim for health care service reimbursement, 339 failure to disclose the
medical basis for denial, 34° and failure to consult directly with an insured's
treating physician prior to denying reimbursement.3 4 1 To enhance the qual-
ity of health care services' delivery and reimbursement under preferred pro-
vider health insurance plans by reducing the incidence of insurer misconduct
giving rise to bad faith claims, the State Board of Insurance should amend
the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules to incorporate stringent standards
for claim denials resulting from utilization review.
Cost-based prospective utilization review programs may directly incorpo-
rate financial considerations into the treatment review process. 342 Health
care providers who participate in cost-base utilization review may be liable
for damages resulting from inadequate treatment, if financial considerations
compel providers to limit improperly the extent of health care services deliv-
ered to insureds.343 The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules contain cer-
tain provisions, however, that effectively protect providers from liability for
underservice in connection with cost-based prospective utilization proce-
dures. Specifically, the Texas rules appropriately prohibit insurers from fi-
nancially rewarding or penalizing physicians for treatment decisions. 344
Moreover, the rules also appropriately stipulate that preferred professional
providers may only share savings from the cost-effective utilization of health
care resources in the aggregate. 345
336. See Carabillo, Liability for Treatment Decisions: How Far Does It Extend?, 393
PRACT. L. INST. 341, 381-89 (1986).
337. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 576, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 486 (1973); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987). For an analysis of the insurers' duty of good faith and fair dealing, see Comment,
Bad Faith: Limiting Insurers' Extra-Contractual Liability in Texas, 41 Sw. L.J. 719 (1987).
338. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1979); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 354, 723 P.2d 703 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc); Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Whitaker, 687 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
339. Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866 (1981).
340. Delgado v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 300, 203 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984).
341. McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
342. See Chenen, Hospitals that Use Dollar-Based Review Are Vulnerable to Charges of
"Bad Faith", MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 12, 1985, at 106, 106-09.
343. Id.
344. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3703(2), (3) (1986); see TMA Safeguard Memo, supra
note 5, at 2 (utilization derived penalty charges would destroy physician's ability to exercise
good judgment on behalf of patient); accord AMA JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 281, § 2.09
(although physicians should be conscious of costs and avoid prescribing unnecessary services,
patient care should take precedence over other economic considerations).
345. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3703(3) (1986).
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COMMENTS
F Green Light to Optional Quality Assurance Review
Quality assurance procedures require insurers to evaluate the delivery of
health care services on a retrospective basis pursuant to professional stan-
dards of care.346 The Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules establish mini-
mal guidelines for implementing an optional delegated quality assessment
program. 347 Moreover, the State Board of Insurance limited the scope of the
Texas guidelines to address only quality assurance procedures for preferred
physician providers. 348 The quality assurance guidelines provided by the
Texas rules also fail to identify specifically the party responsible for assuring
the quality of health care services. Finally, Texas quality assurance guide-
lines neither guarantee the confidentiality of quality assurance proceedings
nor provide immunity from liability for participants in quality assurance
activities. 349
Quality assurance procedures constitute a direct mechanism for evaluat-
ing the quality of health care services delivered by professional providers
pursuant to preferred provider arrangements. In contrast to the comprehen-
sive provisions relating to mandatory quality assurance adopted by certain
other states,350 the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules neither require in-
surers to institute quality assurance programs nor provide adequate guide-
lines for establishing an optional program. To guarantee the delivery of
quality PPA health care services, the State Board of Insurance should
amend the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules to require insurers to imple-
ment a quality assurance program that monitors the performance of all pro-
fessional providers as a mandatory component of an operational preferred
provider arrangement.
Several insurers and providers who submitted comments in connection
with the Texas Preferred Provider Plan rulemaking process requested the
State Board of Insurance to clarify their respective roles with respect to qual-
ity assurance.351 In response to the requests for clarification, the final rules
define quality assessment as a mechanism for evaluating the level of care
provided to insureds pursuant to preferred provider health benefit plans, 352
permit, but do not require, insurers to conduct quality assessment 353 and
stipulate that insurers electing to conduct quality assessment act only
through a physician panel. 354 As presently drafted, however, the rules still
346. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
347. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3702, 3.3705(3) (1986); see WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra
note 104, at 4.
348. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3702 (1986).
349. See WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra note 104, at 5.
350. See supra note 227.
351. See Aetna Comments, supra note 270, at 3; American General Comments, supra note
273, at 3; J. Ponder, Comments of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, Inc. on Texas Pre-
ferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3705 (1986) 5 (Jan. 16, 1986);
TMA Comments, supra note 5, at 25.
352. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3702 (1986).
353. Id. § 3.3705(3).
354. Id.; see TMA Comments, supra note 5, at 25; TMA Safeguard Memo, supra note 5, at
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fail to clarify adequately the quality assurance roles of insurer and provider.
Although the rules indicate that an insurer may initiate quality assessment
efforts,3 55 they also require the insurer to defer to a panel of contract physi-
cians for the purpose of carrying out quality assessment activities.356 As a
result, the quality assessment scheme proposed by the rules fails to address
explicitly whether the insurer or the provider is ultimately responsible for
assuring that quality care is delivered under preferred provider plans.
A specific allocation of the responsibility for quality assurance takes on
particular significance in light of the rules' appropriate proprovider ban on
hold harmless clauses in preferred provider contracts.3 57 By analogy to the
duty imposed on hospitals to protect patients from recognizable malprac-
tice,358 preferred provider plan sponsors that facilitate the delivery of health
care services by entering into contracts with providers of care may be held to
possess a duty to evaluate the quality of care delivered by panel physicians.
In comments on the proposed rules, one insurer argued, however, that the
preferred provider insurance product is merely a mechanism for financing
and not for providing health care services.3 59 Under this rationale, the in-
surer whose role is limited to that of a reimbursement entity is removed from
the process of delivering health care services, and, therefore, is justifiably
exempt from liability.36°
To eliminate the present ambiguity in the rules concerning the party re-
sponsible for quality assurance, the State Board of Insurance should amend
the rules to allocate responsibility for quality assurance in a manner that
preserves the traditional roles of the health care provider and insurer. Be-
cause the rules' open panel mandate prevents insurers from evaluating the
355. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3702 (1986).
356. Id. § 3.3705(3).
357. Id. § 3.3705(5); see TMA Comments, supra note 5, at 26; TMA Safeguard Memo,
supra note 5, at 5 (insurers and physicians should be responsible for their respective decisions;
tort liability should not be disturbed by requiring physicians to insure insurance company).
For a sample preferred provider contract hold-harmless clause, see CALIFORNIA MED. ASS'N,
REVISED PHYSICIAN'S CONTRACTING HANDBOOK 3 (1985).
358. See Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its
Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429 (1973) (commentator observes
that community hospitals have evolved into corporate institution responsible for supervising
delivery of quality health care services); Tottenham, Current Hospital Liability in Texas, 28 So.
TEX. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1987) (commentator asserts corporate liability theory supports cause of
action for hospital negligence in selection of physicians, retention of incompetent physicians,
failure to supervise physicians, and failure to formulate or enforce hospital policies set forth in
bylaws and accreditation' standards).
359. American General Comments, supra note 273, at 3; see also Butler, supra note 321, at
362 (unlike hospital, primary purpose of PPA is to provide alternative mechanism for financ-
ing health care services).
360. S. Robertson, Comments of Health Ins. Ass'n of America on Texas Proposed Pre-
ferred Provider Plan Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3,3701-3.3705 (1986) 2 (Jan. 15, 1986);
R. Sampson, Comments of Mutual of Omaha on Texas Proposed Preferred Provider Plan
Rules, 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.3701-3.3705 (1986) 2 (Jan. 8, 1986) [hereinafter Mutual of
Omaha Comments]. See Butler, supra note 321, at 362 (commentator argues that since serv-
ices delivered pursuant to PPA are not provided in central location facilitating regular obser-
vation of medical practice and since PPAs have limited ability to impose sanctions on




competency of providers as a prerequisite to panel membership,361 insurers
are neither sufficiently informed nor authorized to monitor the quality of
health care service delivery. On the other hand, federal regulations, 362 state
licensing statutes,363 and guidelines established by independent professional
organizations 364 already compel providers to engage in a periodic review of
quality of care. As a result, pre-existing peer review mechanisms employed
by the provider community represent the most effective vehicle for assuring
the delivery of quality health care services pursuant to preferred provider
arrangements. Mandatory quality assessment through peer review promotes
the delivery of health care services that comply with professionally recog-
nized standards of care and thereby serves as a mechanism for checking po-
tential PPA liability for damages incurred in connection with the delivery of
substandard care.
Finally, the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules neither specifically pre-
serve the confidentiality of the records and proceedings of PPA quality as-
surance panels, nor insulate providers who serve on or offer information to
the panels from liability associated with peer review. 365 As a codification of
the "qualified privilege" doctrine, 366 article 4447d of the Texas Revised Civil
361. See supra notes 267, 269 and accompanying text.
362. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat.
3743 (1986); Diosegy & Stravitz, Peer Review and the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986, TEX. HEALTH L. REP., Aug. 1987, 1, 1-33; Dunn, Federally Sponsored Medical Peer
Review, TEX. HEALTH L. REP., June 1987, 13, 13-19.
363. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 3.08 (Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1988)
(identifies conduct or omissions that may result in disciplinary sanctions, including nonthera-
peutic prescription or treatment, recurring gross overcharging or overtreatment, recurring
meritorious health care liability claims); id. art. 4495b, § 5.06(b) (physicians and peer review
committees required to report to Texas State Board of Medical Examiners (TSBME) any phy-
sicians or medical students who exhibit real and present danger to patient health through lack
of competence, impaired status, or failure to adequately care for patients); id. art. 4495b,
§ 5.06(b) (health facilities and peer review committees required to file written report to
TSBME concerning any professional review action adversely affecting physician clinical privi-
leges for more than 30 days, or suspension of clinical privileges during or in lieu of investiga-
tion by professional review committee relating to possible incompetence or improper
professional conduct; medical societies required to report possible incompetence or improper
professional conduct; medical societies required to file written report when professional review
action adversely affects association membership).
364. The American Medical Association (AMA) regards peer review of professional con-
duct as a necessary and recognized compromise of a physician's absolute professional freedom.
AMA JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 281, § 9.10. According to the AMA, peer review bal-
ances a physician's freedom to exercise professional judgment against his obligation to do so
competently. Id. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH), a private
credentialing organization, requires hospitals to institute a continuing quality assurance pro-
gram designed "to objectively and systematically monitor and evaluate the quality and appro-
priateness of patient care, pursue opportunities to improve patient care, and resolve identified
problems." JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HosPs., ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS, QA.1 (1987); see Div. of Educ. & Div. of Accreditation, Joint Comm'n on Ac-
creditation of Hosps., Monitoring and Evaluation of the Quality and Appropriateness of Care:
A Hospital Example, 5 QUALITY REV. BULL. 326-30; see also TEXAS MED. ASS'N, CONSTITU-
TION AND BYLAWS ch. 15, § 15.471 (rev. 1985) (each county medical society required to es-
tablish public grievance committee to field complaints concerning ethical and professional
conduct of society members).
365. See WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra note 104, at 5.
366. See Wilcox, New Legislative Protections and Challenges in Peer Review, TEX. MED.,
Mar. 1986, at 68, 68.
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Statutes367 protects the records and proceedings of any hospital or medical
organization review committee from discovery and immunizes both persons
who furnish information to medical peer review committees and the commit-
tee members, employees and agents from liability resulting from perform-
ance review.368 Insurer-sponsored PPA quality assurance activities may fall
within the scope of article 4447d, if the PPA physician review panel qualifies
as a medical organization committee under the statute.3 69 To ensure confi-
dentiality and immunity in quality assurance review, the State Board of In-
surance should amend the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules to
specifically incorporate the provisions of article 4447d.
To facilitate the comprehensive review of the quality of health care serv-
ices delivered under preferred provider arrangements, the State Board of In-
surance should further amend the Texas Preferred Provider Plan Rules to
expressly incorporate the provisions of article 4447d to protect the confiden-
tiality of all quality assurance proceedings and to provide immunity from
liability for participants in quality assurance review.
367. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
368. Id. For an analysis of the Texas statutory provisions relating to discovery of the
records of peer review proceedings and immunity from civil liability for participants in peer
review in Texas, see Butler, Records and Proceedings of Hospital Committees Privileged Against
Discovery, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 97 (1987); Davis, Committee's Records 'Privileged', TEX. Hosp.,
Jan. 1986, at 10, 10- 11; Southwick & Slee, Quality Assurances in Health Care: Confidentiality
of Information and Immunity for Participants, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 343, 358, 374-75 (1984);
Wilcox, supra note 366, at 68-71.
369. See WLE TEXAS ALERT, supra note 104, at 5.
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